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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Motivation is the art of getting people to do what you 
want them to do because they want to do it. 
(Dwight “Ike” David Eisenhower, 34th President of the United 
States of America) 
 
This quotation of David Eisenhower gives an idea of the 
challenge to find the right way to motivate people. Usually, 
organizations try to motivate their employees by monetary incentives 
like bonuses or performance-based compensation schemes. 
Especially in the short run, these kinds of extrinsic motivation can be 
quite successful (see e.g. Gibbons (1997), Lazear (2000)). However, 
this positive effect is seen much more controversial by psychologists 
(and in recent years by economists, too) who claim that contingent 
rewards can undermine an employee’s intrinsic motivation, i.e. the 
desire to perform a task for his own sake. Hence, motivation can 
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even be reduced instead of increased by extrinsic incentives (e.g. 
Deci et al. 1999).  
If employees should be motivated intrinsically, one should take 
into account the social nature of most individuals’ behavior. People 
with social preferences like reciprocity (Trivers 1971), altruism 
(Andreoni 1988a) or inequity aversion (Fehr/Schmidt 1999) might be 
motivated by trust or fairness concerns, too. Fair people might 
perform better if they feel treated fairly themselves or trustful people 
might appreciate being seen as trustworthy, too. For example, 
employees who do not only care about their own absolute wage level 
but also about their own wage compared to their colleagues’ wages 
might be demoralized if they earn less (or even more) as their 
colleagues (Bewley 2007). When presuming that employees have the 
aforementioned social preferences, an employer could be better off 
by not revealing the firm’s internal pay structure to the employees. 
Further, trustful people might appreciate being seen as trustworthy 
themselves. Hence, they might perform better if the employer trusts 
in them and deliberately refrains from implementing strict control 
mechanisms.  
 
Economic models and experimental investigations of the social 
nature of individual behavior are major subjects of the field of 
research of behavioral economics. Behavioral economics take into 
account that many interpersonal relationships in repeated interactions 
as well as in single encounters are based on trust and social 
preferences like reciprocity, inequity aversion or fairness. In line 
with Rousseau et al. (1995: 395), trust is “a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. Thus, trustful 
individuals are willing to be vulnerable because they anticipate their 
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counterpart not to exploit them but to react reciprocally. This is in 
contrast to what is assumed by the standard economic theory where 
people are acting selfishly and try to maximize their own material 
payoff. According to this, trust and social preferences do not play 
any role in individuals’ behavior. At most, they are part of a rational 
decision-making being not distinguishable from other rational profit-
maximizing calculations. The emotional side of trust is completely 
neglected. 
Thus, if a firm takes into account the social nature of most 
individuals’ behavior this might lead to more intrinsically motivated 
employees. In an organizational culture based on principles of trust 
and reciprocity employees might perform not because they are forced 
to but because it is their own desire to do a good job. Hence, when 
employees rely on the employer and on each other, a firm’s overall 
performance might even be increased compared to a company culture 
that is characterized by control, monitoring or major extrinsic 
motivators. 
 
There is ample empirical evidence for the existence of social 
preferences. A lot of studies show that many people do not behave 
purely selfishly but do care for each other even without maximizing 
their own profit (see e.g. Kahneman et al. 1986, Fehr et al. 1993, 
Fehr/Gächter 1998, 2000a, Gächter/Fehr 2002, Fehr/Schmidt 2003). 
Starting with Akerlof (1982), economists began to increase the 
explanatory power of economic theory by adding psychological 
phenomena to standard neoclassical preferences. For example, 
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) develop a framework that takes into 
account that players’ payoffs do not only depend on what others do 
but on what others think, too. Rabin (1993) offers an approach to 
implement reciprocity to standard economic theory. While Rabin 
  
 
10
abstracts from the sequential structure of strategic situations, 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) offer an extension of Rabin’s 
approach by developing a solution concept for sequential reciprocity 
equilibria. 
Other economic models consider that people are inequity averse 
and care about their own payoff as well as about their relative payoff 
compared to other people (see e.g. Fehr/Schmidt 1999 and 
Bolton/Ockenfels 2000). But until now, not much work has been 
done to combine the intentional and distributional approach. A 
notable exception is given by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) who 
assume that people’s behavior is driven by both, the intention as well 
as the consequences of an action. Thus, this theory can also explain 
why the same consequences of an action can trigger different 
reactions. 
 
This thesis aims to highlight the impact and the interaction of 
trust and other-regarding preferences in organizations. Each chapter 
analyzes a specific aspect of an experimental labor market and 
investigates the influence of trust and social preferences on the way 
to motivate people in organizations. 
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the impact of trust on people’s 
need to reciprocate and by this on the individuals’ behavioral pattern. 
In chapter 2 we replicate a recent contribution of Armin Falk and 
Michael Kosfeld (2006) who analyze the impact of control on agents’ 
reaction in a dictator game between one principal and one agent. The 
agent has to decide if he wants to give any points from his initial 
endowment to the principal. If the principal wants to be sure of 
receiving at least a certain minimum amount, he has the option to set 
a requested minimum transfer to the agent. If the principal decides 
not to restrict the choice set, this decision can be interpreted as a 
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signal of trust towards the agent. Falk and Kosfeld (henceforth called 
F/K) show that agents who are not controlled and feel trusted by the 
principal reciprocate to this kind intention and deliberately offer 
higher transfers to the principal. F/K run several treatments to check 
for the robustness of this effect, but they never check for a variation 
in the wording of the experimental instructions. However, even 
though the theory of rational choice postulates that the decision 
between two options should be independent with regard to the 
context, a lot of studies have shown that the context in which an 
action takes place is an important determinant of human behavior 
(see e.g. Tversky/Kahneman 1981, 1986, Brewer/Kramer 1986, 
Fleishman 1988, Roth 1995, Hertwig/Ortmann 2001, Levitt/List 
2006). Hence, in order to control if different contexts might 
influence agents’ reaction to the principal’s decision to trust or not, 
we use three different kinds of instructions with different wordings 
to explain exactly the same experimental design. Indeed, we find a 
significant impact of the wording. Instructions can trigger a demand 
effect that pushes the participants’ attention in a certain direction and 
induces a desired behavioral pattern. 
Since many relationships in real labor markets occur between 
more than two persons, in chapter 3 we investigate whether the 
positive behavioral consequences of trust as shown by F/K also hold 
in an extended team situation. As it is a well known issue that 
findings from individual behavior cannot be appropriately translated 
into group behavior regularities (see e.g. Kerr et al. 1996, 
Bornstein/Yaniv 1998, Kocher/Sutter 2005, Kocher et al. 2006, 
Kocher/Sutter 2007, Kugler et al. (2007)), we extend the 
experimental design from chapter 2 to a situation between one 
principal and several agents, running one treatment with three and 
another treatment with nine agents per group. Neither treatment 
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allows for any interaction between the agents. As mentioned above, 
the significant impact of trust is at least partly due to the specific 
wording used in the instructions of F/K. To control for this effect, we 
run both team treatments with different instructions in line with those 
we used in chapter 2. The instructions are just slightly adapted to the 
team context. Interestingly, we find that the positive impact of trust 
does not hold in an extended multiple-agents context. Even more, 
independent of the wording of the instructions we observe benefits of 
control in teams in all treatments. We show that control is even more 
effective when the number of agents increases because agents’ effort 
decreases systematically with an increasing group size. This effect 
might be motivated by a psychological phenomenon called social 
loafing. According to this, agents’ motivation might decrease with an 
increasing number of group members, because participants feel less 
responsible for the output and thus may feel that they can “hide in 
the crowd” (Davis 1969). 
Chapter 4 still deals with the impact of the restriction of the 
range of possible contributions, but this time, we investigate this 
effect in a team situation that allows for an interaction between the 
agents and therefore offers the opportunity to take advantage of the 
other team members’ contribution while reducing once own 
contribution. A lot of studies deal with this team specific problem 
called free-riding (see e.g. Davis/Holt 1993, Fehr/Gächter 2000b, 
Ledyard 1995). Issues to reduce this major problem are often based 
on the implementation of extrinsic incentive schemes (Holmström 
1982, Nalbantian/Schotter 1997) disregarding that these extrinsic 
motivators might undermine any intrinsic motivation of the team 
members (Deci 1971, Fehr/Gächter 2002). Thus, in chapter 4 we 
investigate the impact of different ranges of contributions on a 
team’s coordination problem. Beside the option to restrict the agents’ 
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choice set to a certain minimum amount (as in chapters 2 and 3) the 
principal can also decide to set an upper limit instead of setting a 
lower limit. If the principal limits the agents’ contribution to an 
upper limit, he might signal that he cares about his agents, because 
the upper limit is slightly above each agent’s team best contribution 
(maximizing the team’s output excluding the principal) but clearly 
below the agents’ first best contribution (maximizing the team’s 
output including the principal). Hence, reciprocal agents might 
perceive the principal’s decision to restrict the choice set above as a 
kind action and respond with a higher contribution. In contrast to this 
and according to the preceding chapters, if the principal requests a 
certain minimum amount from each agent, the agents might feel 
distrusted and might punish this unkind intention by providing lower 
contributions. The specific borders of the given ranges of 
contributions have been chosen according to the contribution in the 
Nash equilibrium, in the team best and the first best situation. Thus, 
the principal chooses one out of three ranges to offer to his team that 
consists of three agents. However, due to the problem of free-riding, 
we expect the agents to perceive the restriction of the choice set in a 
different manner as in chapters 2 and 3. If the principal sets a lower 
limit to the agents, he does not only ensure a certain payoff for his 
own, but he also protects the agents from each other, because the 
agents, too, can be sure to get a certain minimum amount. Since the 
risk being exploited by the other team members is limited to the 
lower limit, the agents might be willing to give a higher contribution 
as if their range of contribution was not restricted below. 
Furthermore, to check whether the impact of the restriction of the 
choice set might change if the agents are able to communicate, we 
implement a chat-software in a further treatment that allows the 
agents to chat about their contributions. The results significantly 
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show that a requested minimum amount can be a helpful support for 
the agents to reduce their coordination problem. Even more, team 
performance in a whole can be improved. We also find that 
communication increases the entire contribution but does not change 
the agents’ attitude towards the different ranges of contributions. 
 
While chapters 2, 3 and 4 concentrate on the impact of trust and 
reciprocity, chapters 5 and 6 consider the influence of another social 
preference, namely the impact of inequity aversion when workers are 
paid unequal wages. In chapter 5 we experimentally investigate the 
interdependencies between the consequences and the employer’s 
intention of unequally paid wages in teams of one employer and two 
workers. In line with Mohnen et al. (2007), we use a real effort task 
to make workers feel a real disutility from providing effort instead of 
feeling a disutility in terms of monetary costs as in typical abstract 
effort decisions. We conduct three treatments. In each treatment, 
workers receive a fixed wage which is independent of their 
performance. By solving their real effort task they can just increase 
the employer’s payoff. In treatment 1, workers are equally and in 
treatment 2 they are unequally paid. In both treatments the wages are 
exogenously given by the experimenters, i.e. the employer himself 
has nothing to decide. By this we are able to keep the workers from 
reacting reciprocally with regard to the employer’s intention. Hence, 
any differences in agents’ behavior between the first and second 
treatment should be due to distributional concerns. In treatment 3 the 
principal can decide whether to pay equal wages or to pay a lower 
wage to one worker keeping the residual fixed wage for his own. 
Differences in agents’ behavior now might be due either to 
reciprocity or to inequity aversion. However, comparing treatment 2 
and 3, differences might be referred to reciprocal influences. Our 
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results show that neither pure distributional nor pure intentional 
concerns can explain agents’ reaction to unequal wages. Their 
behavior seems to be strongly affected by both aspects. 
In chapter 6 we investigate again the impact of revealed internal 
pay structures in organizations on workers’ motivation. This time we 
also try to distinguish between vertical inequity aversion (between 
two hierarchy levels) and horizontal inequity aversion (within one 
hierarchy level). Therefore, we study a simple gift-exchange game 
between one principal and three agents in two different treatments. 
The principal offers three wages (either equal or individual) to the 
agents and the agents respond by making an abstract effort decision 
that is costly to them and that reduces their payoff. In the first 
treatment, agents are not informed about their co-workers’ wages and 
efforts, but in the second treatment they are. Our results show that 
agents’ behavior is mainly influenced by reciprocity. In contrast, 
distributional concerns play a minor role: in both treatments, we do 
not find any impact of vertical inequity aversion, but we observe a 
slightly significant effect of horizontal inequity aversion between the 
workers in the treatment with revealed pay structures. 
The results of the five experimental studies of this thesis 
demonstrate that trust and other-regarding preferences can indeed 
explain many aspects of human behavior. However, ambiguity still 
remains. Further research is needed in order to understand in depth 
how social preferences work and interplay and how people can be 
motivated intrinsically based on the social nature of their behavioral 
pattern.  
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Chapter 2 
On Trust and Demand Effects 1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The context in which an action takes place is a fundamental 
determinant of human behavior. This finding has been shown and 
analyzed by many researchers in the past (see e.g. 
Tversky/Kahneman 1981, 1986, Brewer/Kramer 1986, Fleishman 
1988, Roth 1995, Hertwig/Ortmann 2001, Levitt/List 2006). Even 
though the theory of rational choice postulates that the decision 
between two options should not be reversed due to a change of the 
context, the heavy influence of a complex set of relational situations, 
social norms, past experiences or the alternative descriptions of a 
decision problem cannot be neglected. Several studies concentrate on 
the impact of different environments or the presentation of a 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Gerlach (2007a). 
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situation in prisoner dilemma or public goods games. Andreoni 
(1995) for example shows the negative impact of a negative instead 
of positive framing in a standard linear public goods setting. This 
result is supported by Sonnemans et al. (1998) who investigate this 
issue in a step-level public goods setting where the public good is 
only provided if the sum of the individual contribution exceeds a 
given threshold. Cookson (2000) investigates three different kinds of 
presentation of the same standard repeated public goods game and 
also find a significant impact of framing. 
Burnham et al. (2000) investigate the impact of the wording of 
instructions in an extensive form two person trust game. The matched 
person in the trust game is labeled “partner” in one treatment and 
“opponent” in a second treatment. They show that trustworthiness 
with “partner” is more than twice as high as with “opponent” which 
in turn increases trust, too. Connotation seems to play an even more 
important role in a trust context. 
Thus, the replicability of experiments might be influenced by 
even slightly changed instructions (see e.g. Camerer et al. 1989, 
Camerer 2003: Chapter 2.5, Hoffmann et al. 2000). Vernon Smith 
states that “in two-person interactions, instructions often matter so 
much that they must be considered a (powerful) treatment” (Smith 
2002: 101). This effect refers to what psychologists call to be a 
demand effect. Due to a special (or even missing) context 
participants might infer that they are demanded by the experimenter 
to behave in a certain way (Loewenstein 1999).  
The aim of this study is to investigate if the wording in the 
experimental instructions of a dictator game might generate a 
demand effect that induces a certain behavioral pattern. We follow a 
recent contribution of Armin Falk and Michael Kosfeld (2006) who 
investigate the impact of the restriction of the choice set on people’s 
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motivation. They designed an experimental study between one 
principal and one agent. With an initial endowment of 120 points, the 
agent has to decide if he wants to give any points to the principal. If 
the principal wants to be sure of receiving a certain minimum 
amount, he has the option of setting a minimum transfer of 10 points. 
Before the agent gets to know if the principal actually decides to 
control or not, he has to submit a transfer choice for each of the two 
ranges. 
Falk/Kosfeld (henceforth called F/K) show that agents 
voluntarily choose higher transfers if they are not controlled. Thus, 
agents are more likely to react kindly when they feel trusted by their 
principal instead of being forced by control. In order to check for the 
robustness of this effect, the authors ran several control treatments. 
They show the same effect when choosing other limits (5 points and 
20 points), when playing a gift-exchange game and when omitting 
the strategy method. However, they never vary the wording of the 
instructions. 
 
To control for the different contexts in which the participants 
have to make their decision we use three kinds of instructions with 
different wordings to explain exactly the same dictator game. First, 
we replicate the experiment with the original instructions of F/K. 
Using the phrase “participant B can decide to force participant A to 
give at least 10 points or to leave him completely free to decide” we 
find that these instructions strongly accentuate the negative meaning 
if the principal decides to control the agent and therefore might 
influence the agents’ transfer decision. Thus, we use a second kind of 
instructions differing from the originals in just one expression. 
Avoiding the wording “to force” and “to leave him completely free to 
decide”, now the principal has the possibility “to constrain or not to 
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constrain the agent”. But as these second instructions still point out 
the negative denotation of the decision to control due to the word “to 
constrain”, we also design a third kind of instructions that are as 
neutral as possible. We avoid any emphasis on the intent of the 
principal’s decision by letting the principal just “offer one out of two 
kinds of contract that allow the agent to choose his transfer from 
different ranges”. 
Our results show that the framing of the decision context 
significantly influences agents’ reaction. Using the original F/K-
instructions, we are able to replicate the effect that agents voluntarily 
give higher transfers if they are not controlled. But this phenomenon 
disappears using the slightly changed instructions and is even 
reversed in the neutral instructions where standard economic theory 
can be confirmed. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we present 
the experimental design and procedure. Section 2.3 derives our 
behavioral predictions. Section 2.4 presents the experimental results 
which are discussed in section 2.5. The paper concludes in section 
2.6. 
 
 
 
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics at the University of Cologne. 180 
participants (60 per treatment) were recruited via the online 
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004), all of them students from 
  
 
20
different faculties of the University of Cologne. We conducted two 
sessions with 30 participants per treatment. None of the students took 
part in more than one session. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher 1999). All sessions 
were played one-shot using the strategy method and lasted about 
thirty minutes. Students left the laboratory with an average payoff of 
11 €. 
In the beginning of the experiment, each participant threw a 
number between 1 and 30 that indicated his place in the laboratory 
and the role he was assigned to in the experiment. The instructions 
were distributed and questions were answered. After this, the 
participants were randomly assigned to groups consisting of one 
agent (called player A) and one principal (called player B) and the 
experiment started.  
With an initial endowment of 120 points, the agent had to 
decide if he wanted to give any points to the principal. The agent’s 
payoff was 120A xπ = − . The principal received twice the amount the 
agent offered, so his profit function was 2P xπ = . However, if the 
principal wanted to be sure of receiving a certain minimum amount, 
he had the option of setting a minimum transfer of 10 points. Thus, 
the principal had to decide whether he wanted to control the agent 
and therefore offered a range of [10; 120] or whether he refrained 
from controlling by offering a range of [0; 120] to the agent. Before 
the agent got to know if the principal actually decided to control or 
not, he had to submit a transfer choice for each of the two ranges. 
 
The three treatments differ in the wording we use in the 
instructions. In the first treatment, we use the original instructions of 
F/K. These instructions strongly highlight the intention of the 
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principal’s decision when he decides to restrict or not the agent’s 
choice set by using the following expression: “Participant B is able 
to force participant A to give him at least 10 points. But he can also 
decide not to constrain participant A and to leave him completely 
free to decide”.2 Henceforth, this treatment will be called T[force]. 
In the second treatment, we slightly modify these instructions. 
Instead of the expression mentioned above we use the following 
wording: “Participant B is able to constrain participant A in order 
to get at least 10 points. But he can also decide not to constrain 
participant A”. Following, we call this treatment T[constrain]. 
Since both instructions obviously point out the principal’s 
intention of the restriction, we design our third instructions as neutral 
as possible. We avoid any special emphasis on the meaning of the 
restriction using the following formulation: “Player A offers a 
contract to player B. He can choose between two different types of 
contract. Contract 1: Player B has to offer a transfer from the range 
of [0; 120]. Contract 2: Player B has to offer a transfer from the 
range of [10; 120].” This treatment is now called T[neutral]. Table 
2.1 opposes the main message of each treatment. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The original instructions of F/K are in German, too. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of instructions 
T[force] T[constrain] T[neutral] 
Before participant A 
decides how many points 
he wants to give to B, B 
can set a minimum 
transfer. Concretely, 
participant B is able to 
force participant A to 
give him at least 10 
points. But he can also 
decide not to constrain 
participant A and to 
leave him completely 
free to decide. So there 
are two cases: 
 
Case 1: Participant B 
forces participant A to 
transfer at least 10 
points. In this case, 
participant A can transfer 
any amount between 10 
and 120 to B. 
 
Case 2: Participant B 
leaves participant A free 
to decide and does not 
force him to transfer at 
least 10 points. In this 
case, participant A can 
transfer any amount 
between 0 and 120 to B. 
Before participant A 
decides how many points 
he wants to give to B, B 
can set a minimum 
transfer. Concretely, 
participant B is able to 
constrain participant A, 
in order to get at least 
10 points. But he can 
also decide not to 
constrain participant A. 
So there are two cases: 
 
 
 
Case 1: Participant B 
constrains participant A 
to transfer at least 10 
points. In this case, 
participant A can transfer 
any amount between 10 
and 120 to B. 
 
Case 2: Participant B 
does not constrain 
participant A. In this 
case, participant A can 
transfer any amount 
between 0 and 120 to B. 
Player A offers a 
contract to player B. He 
can choose between two 
different types of 
contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract 1: Player B has 
to submit a transfer from 
the range of [0; 120]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract 2: Player B has 
to submit a transfer from 
the range of [10; 120]. 
 
[Note: Original instructions are all in German, translation by the author]. 
 
 
 
2.3 Behavioral Predictions 
 
In this section we derive the behavioral predictions we expect to 
observe. First, we concentrate on differences between the control and 
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no-control condition within each treatment and analyze the 
differences between the treatments afterwards. 
There are a lot of theoretical approaches (e.g. Rabin 1993, 
Fehr/Schmidt 1999, Bolton/Ockenfels 2000, 
Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk/Fischbacher 2006) as well as 
experimental studies (e.g. Fehr/Gächter 1998, 2000a, Gächter/Fehr 
2002) that give sufficient evidence for the existence of social 
preferences in most people’s behavior. Thus, people are not 
completely selfish as predicted by standard economic theory but do 
take into account other people’s utility or intention, too. 
If agents were completely selfish, they would give the minimum 
available amount, i.e. 10 points in the control condition and 0 points 
in the no-control condition. However, if agents’ behavior is at least 
partly driven by fairness concerns, they would take into account 
either the principal’s payoff and/or the principal’s intention when 
deciding to control the agent or not. As shown by F/K, the principal’s 
decision to control has a strongly negative impact on the agents’ 
willingness to provide any points. It seems that most agents 
negatively reciprocate by punishing the principal’s unkind decision if 
he sets a requested minimum amount. Thus, as we use the same 
instructions as F/K in T[force], we expect to replicate the negative 
impact of control. Most of the agents should feel distrusted by the 
principal’s decision to control if he decides to set a requested 
minimum transfer and in consequence might reduce their transfer in 
the control condition. 
 
Presumption 2.1: 
In T[force], we expect to observe a negative impact of control. The 
average transfer should be higher in the no-control than in the 
control condition. 
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In T[constrain], the instructions are changed in a very slightly 
way. The verb “to force” as used in the instructions of T[force] gives 
a negative connotation to the principal’s decision in the control 
condition. This negative connotation might even be boosted by the 
extremely positive description of the no-control condition, when the 
principal leaves the agent “completely free to decide”. Hence, the 
extreme confrontation of the two opposite cases might make the 
agents susceptive to the underlying intention when the principal 
decides to control or not. Therefore, we change the instructions in 
T[constrain] in that way, that the confrontation of both conditions is 
less strong, i.e. that the decision to control appears to be less unkind 
and the decision to refrain from using control appears to be less nice. 
However, the instructions that we use in T[constrain] still highlight 
the principal’s underlying intention when he decides to control. 
There should still be enough participants who do not want to be 
constrained by someone and who want to punish the principal if he 
sets the requested minimum transfer, but we expect that there should 
be fewer agents than in T[force] who negatively reciprocate to the 
principal’s decision to control. We derive our second presumption: 
 
Presumption 2.2: 
In T[constrain], we still expect to observe a negative but more 
moderate impact of the restriction of the choice set on agents’ 
transfer decision than in T[force]. The average transfer should be 
slightly higher in the no-control than in the control condition. 
 
In order to eliminate as much as possible any emphasis on the 
principal’s decision, we design the third kind of instructions. Instead 
of verbs like “to force” or “to constrain” that automatically give a 
certain connotation to the principal’s decision, we use the expression 
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that the principal “has to offer a contract to the agent”. However, as 
the decision to control or not is still made by the principal and not by 
an exogenous instance, the intention itself does not disappear, it is 
just less explicitly pronounced. Now we expect most of the agents to 
make their transfer decision in a more rational way, detached from 
the need to react reciprocally to the principal’s intention.  
 
Presumption 2.3: 
In T[neutral], we expect the influence of the restriction of the choice 
set to change. We suppose most of the agents to give a higher 
transfer in the control than in the no-control condition. 
 
In the next step, we compare each of the conditions between the 
three treatments. First, we concentrate on the control condition. As 
mentioned above, we expect agents’ reaction to control to differ with 
regard to the wording of the instructions. As the negative meaning of 
the principal’s decision to control is strongly emphasized if the 
principal forces the agent to give at least 10 points, we expect the 
agents to punish the decision to control most heavily in T[force]. In 
contrast to this, the wording in T[neutral] does not point out the 
intention of the decision to control. That’s why we suppose the 
average transfer in T[neutral] to exceed the two other contracts.  
In line with this argumentation, we expect to observe the 
opposite behavioral pattern in agents’ behavior in the no-control 
condition in the three treatments: 
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Presumption 2.4.1: 
In the control condition, we expect the average transfer to be lowest 
in T[force] and to be highest in T[neutral]. The average transfer in 
T[constrain] ranges between the two other treatments. 
 
Presumption 2.4.2: 
In the no-control condition, the average transfer should be highest in 
T[force] and lowest in T[neutral]. Again, we suppose the average 
transfer in T[constrain] to range between the two other treatments. 
 
 
 
2.4 Experimental Results 
 
First, we analyze descriptively the impact of the restriction of 
the choice set on agents’ behavior within each treatment. Since we 
do not want to make our results sensitive to some extreme outliers, 
we base our analysis on the median rather than on the mean transfers. 
Figure 2.1 shows the median transfers per treatment: 
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Figure 2.1: Median transfers per treatment 
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          [Note: N = 30 observations with and without control per treatment] 
 
 
In T[force], the median transfer in the no-control condition 
obviously exceeds the median transfer in the control condition. 
However, this difference is statistically not significant (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p=0.54), because only 40% of the agents give a 
higher transfer without control compared to 37% of the agents who 
give a higher transfer in the control condition.3 Hence, the part of 
agents reacting positively or negatively to the principal’s decision to 
control is almost the same. The remaining 23% of the agents do not 
react to control and choose equal transfers in both conditions.  
However, the comparison of the median transfers between both 
conditions might be biased because the range of possible transfers is 
not the same with and without control. From a technical point of 
view, transfers have to be higher in the control condition because the 
lowest possible transfer cannot be smaller than 10. In order to control 
                                                 
3 Tables 2.2 - 2.4 in appendix 2.B report in detail agents’ reaction to the 
principal’s decision to control in each treatment. 
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for the constrained nature of the restricted choice set, we follow F/K 
and truncate all transfers that are smaller than 10 equal to 10 in the 
no-control condition and compare again the differences between both 
conditions. In T[force], 33.33% of the agents give a transfer smaller 
than 10 if they are allowed to. If we set those transfers equal to 10, 
the difference between the two conditions now becomes highly 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.008). Thus, 
we can conclude that the decision to control indeed has a negative 
motivational impact on the agent’s transfer submission. 
 
Result 2.1: 
We observe a negative impact of control in T[force]. 
 
In T[constrain], the median transfer in the control condition is 
more than three times as high as the median transfer in the no-control 
condition. 30% of the agents give a higher transfer in the no-control 
condition and 53% give more if they are controlled. However, the 
difference is statistically not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
p=0.42). This might be explained by the fact that those (few) people 
who react negatively to control most often are willing to provide a 
much higher transfer if the principal does not control. In 
T[constrain], those who dislike being controlled give in average 35 
points without control and 13 points with control. Since these high 
differences are partly due to some extreme outliers4, we prefer 
analyzing the median transfers as shown in figure 2.1. However, if 
we look at the mean instead of median transfer, the difference 
between both conditions is quite small. The mean transfer without 
                                                 
4 For example, in T[constrain] there is one outlier giving 100 points in the no-
control condition and 20 points in the control condition. 
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control is even slightly higher than with control.5 To investigate if 
there is any motivational impact of control as it is shown in T[force], 
we control again for the constrained nature of the restricted choice 
set in the control condition by setting all transfers smaller than 10 
equal to 10. The truncation has to be made for 53.33% of the agents. 
Even though this modification still does not lead to a statistically 
significant difference between both conditions, we carefully argue to 
observe the tendency of a motivational effect of the restriction of the 
choice set in T[constrain], which is weakly indicated by a p-value of 
0.124. Thus, we derive our second result: 
 
Result 2.2: 
In T[constrain], the negative impact of control disappears. 
 
Now we come to the third treatment. As mentioned in 
presumption 2.3, in T[neutral] we suppose most of the agents to give 
a higher transfer with control than without control. Indeed, only 13% 
of the agents react negatively to the principal’s decision to restrict 
their choice set. The majority of agents (73%) give a higher transfer 
in the control condition. The difference between the median transfers 
is now statistically highly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
p<0.001). 
There are 60% of the agents who give a transfer below 10 in the 
no-control condition. Thus, we check again if the difference between 
the two conditions might be due to the restricted nature of the choice 
set. We modify again the data by raising transfers that are smaller 
than 10 equal to 10 in the no-control condition. Interestingly, the 
difference between control and no control that was highly significant 
                                                 
5 Figure 2.2 in appendix 2.A shows the mean transfers in all treatments. 
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before the truncation totally disappears (p=0.605). Indeed, the 
difference seems to be due to technical reasons. It seems that agents 
practice the option of giving less than 10 in the no-control condition, 
because they do not feel the need to react reciprocally with regard to 
the principal’s decision not to restrict them. Thus, the decision to set 
a requested minimum amount to the agent apparently has no 
influence on the agent’s motivation in T[neutral]. 
 
Result 2.3: 
In T[neutral], we observe a positive instead of negative impact of 
control. The median transfer is significantly higher in the control 
condition than in the no-control condition. 
 
The first three results already show that the wording of the 
instructions clearly influences the behavioral pattern of the 
participants. Hence, in the next step we look for differences between 
the treatments.  
First, we analyze the control condition. As one can see in figure 
2.1, median transfers in the control condition are 11.5 in T[force] and 
10.0 in T[constrain] and T[neutral]. It seems that the principal’s 
decision to restrict the choice set has no different influences between 
the three treatments (Jonckheere-test). On average, agents give what 
they have to give, but their transfer decision in the control condition 
does not depend on the wording of the instructions. 
 
Result 2.4.1: 
In the control condition, agents’ transfer decision is not influenced 
by the wording of the instructions.  
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I the no-control condition this effect changes. Now median 
transfers are 25.0 in T[force], 3.0 in T[constrain] and 0.5 in 
T[neutral]. These differences are significant between T[force] and 
T[constrain] (Mann-Whitney U-Test, p=0.066) and between T[force] 
and T[neutral] (p=0.013), but not between T[constrain] and 
T[neutral]. However, the transfers are significantly highest in 
T[force] and lowest in T[neutral] (Jonckheere-test, two-tailed, 
p<0.01). Hence, in contrast to the condition with control, the effect 
of the decision not to control strongly depends on the wording or the 
presentation of this decision. If agents perceive the decision not to 
control as a kind action, many of them react reciprocally by giving 
deliberately higher transfers in the no-control condition. 
 
Result 2.4.2: 
In the no-control condition, agents’ transfer decision is strongly 
influenced by the wording in the instructions. The median transfer is 
significantly highest in T[force] and lowest in T[neutral]. 
 
 
 
2.5 Demand Effect 
 
Concluding from the presented results in section 2.4, the 
wording “to force or to leave him completely free to decide” 
obviously induces a demand effect. This demand effect results in a 
certain behavioral pattern differing significantly from the two other 
instructions and therefore seems to be induced by the specific 
wording of the instructions in T[force]. Thus, one can conclude that 
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the wording influences the perception of the principal’s decision. But 
as the medians in the control-condition do not differ from each other, 
it seems that it is not the decision to restrict the choice set that 
strongly influences agents’ reaction, it is moreover the decision not 
to restrict but to trust.  
In T[force], the principal’s underlying intention when deciding 
to control or not is much more striking than in the other treatments. 
According to a German synonym dictionary (Duden 2004), “to 
force”6 has the same meaning as “to press”, “to threaten” or even “to 
terrorize”. Most people do not want to be forced to do something, 
because being forced also implies a dominance relation. Hence, if a 
principal is willing to do without the power to force the agent, this 
decision has to be perceived as an extraordinary kind action to which 
a great fraction of agents answers reciprocally by giving generous 
transfers in the no-control condition.  
Compared to this, the decision not to constrain the agent in 
T[constrain] appears less strong. Synonym expressions for “to 
constrain”7 are for example “to limit”, “to restrict” or “to confine” 
which are all less aggressive than the synonyms mentioned above. 
Furthermore, the decision not to control is less highlighted, because 
in T[constrain] it is said that the principal chooses “not to constrain” 
the agent instead of “to leave him completely free to decide”. Of 
course, there are still agents who perceive the principal’s decision to 
refrain from controlling as a kind action, but the part of those agents 
is smaller than in T[force].8 
                                                 
6 Translation of the German word “zwingen” as used in the F/K instructions. 
 
7 Translation of the German word “einschränken”. 
 
8 However, the difference in the part of agents reacting reciprocally if they are 
not controlled (40% in T[force] and 30% in T[constrain]) is statistically not 
significant (Fisher’s exact test, two-sided, p=0.294). 
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In T[neutral], the principal’s underlying intention is accentuated 
least of all treatments. The wording “to offer a contract” is an 
unemotional expression that appeals very low to the agents’ need of 
reacting reciprocally. Even though in this study it is obvious that the 
consequences of the principal’s decision is the same in all treatments 
because of course player B is still able to force player A to give a 
certain minimum transfer by offering a contract with a range of 
transfer of [10; 120] instead of [0; 120], the notation in T[force] 
suggests a certain valuation of the situation. While the offer of a 
contract is a neutral action being part of each individual’s every-day 
life, the decision to force someone implies a dominance relation that 
should be seen as something negative by most people. The one who 
forces may be seen as an opponent respectively the one who does not 
force as a friend, while someone who offers a contract might rather 
be seen as a (business) partner. Furthermore, in T[neutral] the 
difference between both conditions is hardly highlighted by the 
wording. Even more, the principal’s decision to offer the contract 
with the restricted range might be perceived as more legitimate 
because it is more obvious that the principal’s intention is just to 
protect his own payoff and not to exert his position of power.9 
Consequently, this time the part of agents reacting negatively 
reciprocally10 in T[neutral] (13%) is significantly lower than in 
T[force] (40%) (Fisher’s exact test, two-sided, p=0.020).    
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
9 See Schnedler/Vadovic (2007) for the impact of legitimacy of control. 
 
10 Negatively reciprocating agents are those who give a smaller transfer with than 
without control. 
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2.6 Discussion 
 
In this study we investigate if and to which extent the 
behavioral pattern in a laboratory experiment might be influenced by 
the connotation of the wording in the instructions. We conducted 
three treatments in analogy to Falk/Kosfeld (2006) who analyze the 
impact of control in terms of setting a requested minimum amount in 
a dictator game between one principal and one agent. With an initial 
endowment of 120 points, the agent has to decide how many points 
he wants to give to the principal. If the principal wants to be sure of 
receiving a certain minimum amount, he has the option of setting a 
minimum transfer of 10 points. The three treatments just differ in the 
instructions we use to explain the experiment. 
In the first treatment, T[force], we adopt the original 
instructions that have been used by Falk and Kosfeld. Using the 
wording “to force or to leave completely free to decide”, these 
instructions strongly highlight the negative or positive effect if the 
principal decides to set the restriction or to refrain from it. In the 
second treatment, called T[constrain], we slightly alter these 
instructions by substituting the verb “to force” by “to constrain” and 
by eliminating the expression “to leave completely free to decide”. 
Finally, in the third treatment what we call T[neutral], we use totally 
different instructions that reduces the accentuation on the principal’s 
underlying intention as much as possible, because the principal just 
can decide “to offer one out of two different kinds of contracts”. 
 
According to what we have expected, we find a significant 
impact of the wording in the instructions. While in T[force], agents 
strongly positively reciprocate if the principal does not set a 
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requested minimum amount, this positive effect is clearly diminished 
in T[constrain] and is even eliminated in T[neutral]. Thus, we find 
support for the existence of a demand effect where the wording of 
the instructions induces a certain behavior.  
Interestingly, we do not find any differences between the 
treatments in the control condition, but only in the no-control 
condition. Hence, it seems that agents’ behavior should not be 
interpreted as a negative reaction to control, but moreover as a 
positive reaction to the decision to trust instead to control that 
strongly depends on the connotation by which the decision to control 
is presented. 
 
Our analysis aims to highlight the importance of the wording in 
experimental instructions. Instructions can trigger a demand effect 
that pushes the participants’ attention in a certain direction. This is 
clearly underlined by our results that show that experimental results 
are very sensitive with regard to the wording and should always be 
interpreted against the given background.  
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2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
 
2.A: Mean transfers 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Mean transfers per treatment 
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2.B: Agents’ reaction to control 
 
 
Table 2.2: T[force] 
 
 Positive Neutral Negative 
Number of agents 
 
11 
 
7 
 
12 
 
Relative share 
 
0.37 
 
0.23 
 
0.40 
 
Average x if controlled 
 
12.91 
 
36.43 
 
16.83 
 
Average x if not 
controlled 
4.18 
 
36.43 
 
38.08 
 
 
Table 2.3: T[constrain] 
 
 Positive Neutral Negative 
Number of agents 
 
16 
 
5 
 
9 
 
Relative share 
 
0.53 
 
0.17 
 
0.30 
 
Average x if controlled 
 
10.81 
 
27 
 
13 
 
Average x if not 
controlled 
0.63 
 
27 
 
35 
 
 
Table 2.4: T[neutral] 
 
 Positive Neutral Negative 
Number of agents 
 
22 
 
4 
 
4 
 
Relative share 
 
0.73 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
Average x if controlled 
 
18.73 
 
23.75 
 
18.75 
 
Average x if not 
controlled 
7.59 
 
23.75 
 
27.5 
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2.C: Experimental Instructions used in T[force]    
 
(Note: Original instructions are in German. Changes made in 
T[constrain] are in bold italics.) 
 
You are about to take part in an economic experiment, which is 
financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 
Please read the instructions carefully. Everything you need to 
know for this experiment will be explained to you. In case you have 
any questions, please notify so. Your questions will be answered at 
your desk. All other communication is strictly forbidden throughout 
the whole experiment. 
At the beginning of the experiment, every participant will 
receive a show up fee of 2.50 €. You will be able to earn additional 
points during the experiment. All points earned during the 
experiment will be converted into Euros at the end of the experiment. 
The exchange rate is the following: 
 
1 point = 10 Cent 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your income, which 
you have earned during the experiment, plus the 2.50 € show up fee 
in cash. 
 
The Experiment 
In this experiment one player A and one player B will form a group 
of two. No participant will know the other member of his group, so 
all decisions will be made anonymously. 
 
You are player A (B). 
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At the beginning of the experiment every participant A will receive 
120 points. Participant B will not receive any points. 
 
Decision of player A: 
Player A can choose how many points he wants to transfer to player 
B. Every point transferred from A to B will be doubled by the 
experimenters. Every point transferred from A to B therefore 
decreases A’s income by one point and increases B’s income by two 
points.  
The formula for the earnings looks like this: 
Earning of player A: 120 – transfer 
 
Earnings of player B: 0 + 2*transfer  
 
The following examples will clarify the formulas for the earnings: 
Example 1: A transfers 0 points to B. The earnings will be 120 for A 
and 0 for B. 
Example 2: A transfers 20 points to B. The earnings will be 100 for 
A and 40 for B. 
Example 3: A transfers 80 points to B. The earnings will be 40 for A 
and 160 for B. 
 
Decision of player B: 
B can determine a minimum transfer, before player A has chosen 
how many points he wants to transfer to player B. In particular, 
player B can force (constrain) player A to transfer at least 10 points 
to B. But player B can also choose not to force (to constrain) player 
A to any minimum transfer (and thus to leave the decision 
completely free to player A.)  
  
 
40
There are two possible cases: 
Case 1: Participant B forces (constrains) player A to transfer at least 
10 points to B. In this case player A may transfer any whole 
numbered amount between 10 and 120 to B. 
Case 2: Participant B (leaves the decision free to player A and) does 
not force (does not constrain) him to transfer at least 10 points to B. 
In this case, player A may transfer any amount between 0 and 120 to 
B. 
The experiment therefore consists of two steps: 
Step 1: 
In the first step, player B decides either to force (to constrain) player 
A to a minimum transfer of 10 points or (to leave free the decision 
on the amount to be transferred) (not).  
Step 2: 
In the second step, A decides on the amount, which he wants to 
transfer to B. This may be an amount between 
- 10 and 120, in case B has forced (constrained) player A to 
transfer at least 10 points to B. 
or 
- 0 and 120, in case B has not forced (not constrained) 
player A to transfer at least 10 points to B. 
 
After player A has decided on how many points he wants to transfer 
to B the experiment is over. 
 
(Note: the following part is only contained in the instructions for 
player A. Player B received the instructions, “The decisions of A and 
B will be entered on the monitors at the computers.”) 
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Please take notice: As player A you have to decide on the amount to 
be transferred to B before you know, whether B does force 
(constrain) you to transfer at least 10 points or whether he does not. 
This means, you have to make two decisions. You will submit your 
decision through the following screen: 
 
You are player A. 
You have 120 points. Player B has 0 points. 
You may transfer points to player B. 
Every single point you transfer will be doubled by the experimenters. 
 
Case 1: In case, player B forces (constrains) you to a minimum 
transfer of 10 points: 
How many points do you transfer in this case?    x points 
 
Case 2: In case, player B (leaves the decision completely free to you) 
(does not constrain you): 
How many points do you transfer in this case?    x points 
 
 
So you will specify how many points you will transfer to B, in case 
B forces (constrains) you to transfer a at least 10 points (case 1) and 
in case B (leaves you completely free to decide) (does not constrain 
you) (case 2). 
Which of the two decisions is relevant for the payout, will be 
determined by B’s decision. In case B forces (constrains) you to 
transfer him at least 10 points, your decision specified for case 1 will 
count. In case B (leaves you completely free to decide) (does not 
constrain you) the amount of points specified for case 2 will count.  
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(Note: From here on, there are again identical instructions for both 
participants.) 
 
A screen at the end of the experiment will inform you about the 
decisions made and the earnings resulting from these decisions. 
Your earned points will be exchanged into Euros and paid out to you 
in cash, together with the show up fee. 
 
  
 
43
2.D: Experimental Instructions used in T[neutral] 
 
(Note: Original instructions are in German.) 
 
Periods and Parts 
- The experiment takes one period. 
- You will form a group with another player, so that every 
group consists of two players. However you will not know the 
identity of the other group member. 
- The members of one group will adopt different parts: There is 
one player A and one player B. These parts will be randomly 
assigned to each participant at the beginning of the 
experiment. 
 
Course of Period 
Decision of player A 
- Player A offers a contract to player B. He can choose between 
two different types of contracts: 
o Contract type I: Player B has to offer a transfer from 
the range of [0;120] 
o Contract type II: Player B has to offer a transfer from 
the range of [10;120] 
Decision of player B 
- At the same time, player B will specify his transfer for each 
type of contract depending on player A’s decision of choosing 
contract type I or II. So player B will specify his possible 
transfers within the given interval of each type of contract, 
before he will be informed about player A’s decision on 
contract type I or II. 
Transfers may only be specified in form of whole numbers. 
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- The pay-outs will only be determined by player B’s transfer 
for the type of contract, which is actually chosen by player A. 
Realization of Profits 
- Only after player B has specified his individual transfers for 
each type of contract, player A’s actual decision on the type 
of contract will be announced. 
- Player B’s profit will consist of his starting capital of 120 
Taler minus his transfer for the type of contract previously 
chosen by player A. 
o Profit for player B = 120-transfer 
- Player A will receive the double amount of player B’s transfer 
for the type of contract previously chosen by player A. 
o Profit for player A = 2 x transfer  
 
Starting Capital and Final Pay-out 
- At the beginning of this experiment every player B will be 
provided with a starting capital in form of the experimental 
currency of 120 Taler. Player A will not receive any starting 
capital. At the end of this experiment every participant will 
receive his achieved profit converted into Euros with an 
exchange rate of 0,10 € for one Taler. Additionally, every 
participant will receive a show up fee of 2,50 €. 
 
Important Instructions: 
- No communications will be allowed except via the 
experimental software. 
- All decisions will be anonymous, so that no other participant 
will be able to link a decision to any other participant. 
- The pay-out will also be anonymous, so that no participant 
will find out the pay-out of any other participant. 
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Chapter 3 
The Role of Trust in Teams 11 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The conflicting interests between principal and agent are the 
most frequently mentioned reason why a typical principal-agent 
relationship fails to reach an efficient solution. Looking for example 
at employer-employee relations, the employer wants the employee to 
work as much and as hard as possible for a moderate wage, while the 
employee expects a high wage without exerting too much effort. 
These discrepancies have been investigated in lots of studies from 
different disciplines of research. Based on the neoclassical theory, 
economists recommend to motivate agents extrinsically by rewards 
or close monitoring (e.g. piece rates (Lazear 2000, Paarsch/Shearer 
                                                 
11 This chapter is based on Gerlach (2007b) 
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2000), tournaments (Lazear/Rosen 1981, Bull/Schotter/Weigelt 
1987) or efficiency wages (Shapiro/Stiglitz 1984, 
Acemoglu/Newman 2002))12. Agents do what they are supposed to 
because of an expected reward. In contrast to this kind of motivation 
that is based on regulations, psychologists moreover focus on 
intrinsic motivation. An agent who is intrinsically motivated spends 
time on an action because of the action itself and not because he is 
forced to. Psychologists often claim the negative effects (e.g. Deci 
1971) of extrinsic motivation because extrinsic motivation critically 
depends on the existence and the choice of the right incentive 
scheme. Moreover, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are mostly seen 
as combined components where the intrinsic motivation might be 
undermined by extrinsic incentives. The so called crowding-out 
effect or corruption effect of intrinsic motivation (e.g. Deci 1975, 
Lepper/Greene 1978a, Frey 1997a) has been shown in a couple of 
studies (e.g. Frey/Jegen 2001, Fehr/Gächter 2002, Kunz/Pfaff 2002, 
Fehr/Rockenbach 2003, Irlenbusch/Sliwka 2005a). All of these 
studies have in common that they concentrate on the relationship 
between individuals. Yet, many important relations occur between 
groups of people. Decisions in firms are most often made by groups 
instead of individuals and team work is usually claimed as an 
important factor of success. However, there are also some team-
specific problems such as free-riding. Hence it is a well known issue 
in psychological and economic literature that findings from 
individual behavior cannot be appropriately translated into group 
behavior regularities (e.g. Davis 1969, Kerr et al. 1996, 
Bornstein/Yaniv 1998, Kugler et al. 2007, Kocher et al. 2006, 
Kocher/Sutter 2005, Kocher/Sutter 2007). 
                                                 
12 A review of the provision of incentives is given by Prendergast (1999). 
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Inspired by the results of the contribution of Armin Falk and 
Michael Kosfeld (2006) on which chapter 2 is based, too, the aim of 
this study is to check whether the impact of control is the same when 
the principal restricts the choice set not only for a single agent but 
for a group of agents. We predict agents to perceive the principal’s 
decision to control differently if it is directed towards a team of 
agents and not exclusively towards one agent. 
Using a variant of F/K’s base treatment, in this chapter we look 
at one principal and several agents, running one treatment with three 
and another treatment with nine agents per group. In order to avoid 
any typical free-riding problem, neither treatment allows for any 
interaction between the agents. The principal has to offer the same 
type of contract to all of his three (nine) agents. Hence, he has no 
choice to differentiate between the agents. In the end, the principal’s 
payoff depends on the given amount of one randomly selected agent 
of his group. As shown in chapter 2, the significant impact of control 
is partly due to the specific wording used in the instructions by F/K. 
Therefore we run our team treatments with the instructions used in 
T[neutral] of chapter 2 as well as with the original FK-instructions as 
used in T[force], which are just slightly adapted to the group context. 
 
In the team treatments, we expect to observe the phenomenon of 
social loafing between the agents. Average transfers should decrease 
with an increasing number of group members, because participants 
may feel that they can “hide in the crowd” (Davis 1969). 
Furthermore, as we think that the principal’s decision to control is no 
longer be seen as a signal of distrust if it is directed towards a whole 
team and not exclusively to one agent, the observed transfers should 
be higher when the principal controls as if he does not. Hence, 
control should become more important in bigger groups. The results 
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support our hypotheses: We observe benefits of control in teams. In 
the team treatments, we find a positive instead of negative impact of 
control. Control can no longer be interpreted as a signal of distrust 
towards an individual agent. Furthermore, average transfers decrease 
in the number of team members. These findings are also robust with 
respect to the wording used in the instructions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 
3.2 we generally discuss the theoretical background. In section 3.3 
we derive our hypotheses. We describe the details of the 
experimental design and procedure in section 3.4. The experimental 
results are shown in section 3.5. Section 3.6 controls for the impact 
of the instructions. The chapter concludes with section 3.7. 
 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
 
3.2.1 Motivation Crowding-Out 
 
Economic Theory 
 
Two kinds of behavioral predictions on agents’ behavior in an 
experimental set-up discussed above are in line with economic 
theory. First, pure neoclassical theory assumes that agents are selfish 
and try to maximize their own payoff. Therefore they try to 
maximize their own payoff giving the lowest possible transfer. 
Second, economic models incorporating the impact of social 
preferences in agents’ behavior (e.g. Fehr/Schmidt 1999, 
Bolton/Ockenfels 2000, Fehr/Gächter 2000a, Charness 2004, 
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Falk/Fischbacher 2006) predict that agents are not completely selfish 
but do care for other people’s utility. According to these assumptions 
the agents’ behavior should not be affected by the principal’s 
decision to control or not. A completely inequity averse agent should 
give the same transfer in both cases, with and without control in 
order to equalize the principal’s and his own payoff, irrespective of 
the number of agents per group. As there is no change in profit and 
cost functions there should also be no change in agents’ behavior 
between the treatments.  
But the question is how to explain agents’ behavior if they give 
different transfers in both conditions that exceed the lowest possible 
transfer, a reaction which might be due to a change in agents’ 
motivation. Even though there are some approaches to implement the 
differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in 
economic theory, the effect of motivation crowding-out cannot be 
economically explained. In particular, Frey (1997b: Chapter 4) 
incorporates this effect in a simple economic model, where the 
agent’s utility depends on his own effort as well as on an 
intervention (reward or sanction) by the principal. The agent 
maximizes his utility for a given intervention. If the effort’s marginal 
utility decreases with an increasing value of the intervention, Frey 
calls this the effect of motivation crowding-out. However, the model 
cannot endogenously explain the reasons for this effect, it just shows 
the consequences of the crowding-out effect. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) explicitly describe the process of 
motivation crowding-out in a signaling model. Their central 
assumption is that the agent’s effort costs for a certain task are only 
imperfectly known by the agent but that the principal has additional 
information on these costs. The principal can offer a reward to 
motivate the agent. By choosing the appropriate level of reward 
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(which should be higher the higher the agent’s costs of effort) to 
motivate the agent he automatically sends a signal concerning the 
difficulty of the task. Hence, the agent gets some information about 
his own preferences. Even though higher incentives might cause 
higher efforts, they also might diminish future motivation because of 
the revealed unattractiveness of the task. Nevertheless, the effect of 
motivation crowding-out is not set off via a direct causality between 
incentive and effort. It is caused due to the simultaneous influence of 
the difficulty of the task on both, reward and effort. 
Another approach is offered by Sliwka (2007). Based again on a 
simple principal-agent model, Sliwka assumes that there is at least a 
substantial part of agents always behaving fair, i.e. committing 
oneself to an agreement, even if this agreement is not verifiable. 
Furthermore, Sliwka assumes that this willingness to be fair is 
influenced by a social norm or by other individuals’ behavior. Apart 
from agents who are always fair or unfair, there are also some agents 
who are fair if and only if they think that the part of fair agents is 
sufficiently large. These agents are called the conformists. By setting 
high incentives, the principal gives a signal that there are apparently 
lots of agents who are not fair, because if not the principal could 
save costs by offering a fixed wage contract. This signal, however, 
can influence the conformists’ behavior. Hence, the motivation 
crowding-out effect arises if agents think that unfairness is a 
common way to behave. But still, it is not the agents’ intrinsic 
motivation to engage in a task that is undermined by extrinsic 
motivators, but the agents’ willingness to behave fairly. 
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Cognitive Evaluation Theory 
 
Psychologists already have started analyzing the effect of the 
“hidden costs of reward” in the 1970s (Deci 1976, Lepper/Greene 
1978b). One of the possible explanations derives from the “Cognitive 
Evaluation Theory” (CET). The CET assumes that people need to 
feel autonomous and competent. External factors that seem to 
constrain these needs tend to undermine intrinsic motivation (e.g. 
Amabile et al. 1976, Lepper/Greene 1975, Deci/Porac 1978). 
Therefore, external factors enhancing the feelings of autonomy might 
even help to increase intrinsic motivation (Zuckerman et al. 1978). A 
review with 128 laboratory experiments that try to confirm the CET 
is given by Deci (Deci et al. 1999). However, CET performs poorly 
in explaining work motivation. Maybe the most important problem is 
that the CET implies that managers have to select between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. They have to decide whether they want to 
use external motivators neglecting intrinsic motivation or whether 
they try to maximize the intrinsic motivation forgoing the use of 
external rewards (Gagné/Deci 2005). Even though in the experiment 
of this study the CET might help to explain why agents voluntarily 
give a higher transfer if they are not controlled, it can not serve as an 
explanation why transfers with control could exceed transfers 
without control. Furthermore, as the experimental design implies an 
abstract instead of a real effort, the assumption that intrinsic 
motivation could be a driving factor of subjects’ behavior is critical 
in the context of our experiment. Maybe one could argue that agents 
are intrinsically motivated to participate in the experimental game or 
to react reciprocally to their partner, but the definition of intrinsic 
motivation as an interest and enjoyment of a task does not fit in an 
experiment including an abstract effort decision. 
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Self-Determination Theory 
 
In 1985 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan presented a 
concept of internalization of extrinsic motivators. The theory 
describes how extrinsically motivated behavior can become 
intrinsically motivated. This approach was the beginning of the 
“Self-Determination Theory” (SDT) (Deci/Ryan 1985, 2000, 
Ryan/Deci 2000, Gagné/Deci 2005). The SDT is a meta-theory 
constituted by four theories: the “cognitive evaluation theory”, 
“organismic integration theory”, “causality orientations theory” and 
the “basic needs theory”. SDT concerns the development and 
functioning of personalities in social contexts and focuses on the 
degree to which human behavior is volitional and self-determined. 
First, the SDT differentiates between amotivation and motivation. 
Amotivation means a lack of motivation or no intention to work at 
all. In our experiment, an amotivated agent should give a transfer of 
0 if he is not controlled and a transfer of 10 if he is controlled.  
A central point of the SDT is the classification of motivation in 
controlled and autonomous motivation. Whereas the CET just 
differentiates between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, the SDT 
assumes an autonomy continuum with several stages between fully 
extrinsic and fully intrinsic motivation. Controlled motivation can be 
divided into external and introjected regulation. The external 
regulation corresponds to the typical extrinsic motivation depending 
on reward and punishment of an action. Introjected regulation means 
that a rule has been taken in but not accepted, so the individual is 
controlled via the regulation. Translated in the context of the 
experiment of this chapter agents who are controlled motivated 
dishonor the given constraint of 10 points. In the control-case, they 
just give the minimum transfer of 10 because they are forced to. 
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Autonomous motivation can be divided into identified 
regulation, integrated extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation, 
where intrinsic motivation represents the highest level of 
autonomous motivation. As mentioned above, this kind of motivation 
as an interest and enjoyment of the task hardly can exist in an 
experiment with an abstract effort decision. Identified and integrated 
regulation both mean that a rule has been accepted and taken in and 
therefore it is not seen as an exogenously set constraint. The 
identification with a regulation is reached if individuals identify with 
the value of a certain behavior for their own self-selected goals, 
whereas the integration of a regulation means that the behavior is an 
integral part of the individual itself and therefore self-determined. 
Again, translated in our experimental context, agents who are 
autonomous motivated have taken in the regulation. Probably an 
autonomous motivated agent himself would have decided to control 
if he had been in the principal’s position. So, in contrast to a 
controlled motivated agent who feels being forced by the principal’s 
decision to control, an autonomous motivated agent who can identify 
with the given regulation should not have the negative feeling of 
being restricted in his transfer choice. 
Whether an individual is controlled or autonomous motivated 
first depends on aspects of the social environment like job or work 
climate and second on individual differences in causality orientation 
which can be more autonomous, controlled or impersonal oriented. 
Furthermore, there are three basic psychological needs that are 
important for the internalization of extrinsic motivation, namely the 
need for autonomy, the need for competence and the need for 
relatedness. People need to feel self-determined and to be effective, 
and they also need to feel connected to others in their social 
environment. These needs “provide the basis for predicting which 
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aspects of a social context will support intrinsic motivation and 
facilitate internalization of extrinsic motivation” (Gagné/Deci 2005: 
338). The higher a person’s entitlements to satisfy his basic 
psychological needs the more autonomous oriented the person. In 
contrast, a controlled oriented person’s needs will be more quickly 
satisfied whereas an impersonal oriented individual tends to be 
amotivated.  
As mentioned in the introduction, we used two different kinds 
of instructions in our experiment, the original instructions used by 
FK and our own instructions. While in the FK-instructions the 
principal “is able to force13 the agent to give him at least 10 points or 
to decide not to limit the agent and to leave him completely free to 
decide” in our own instructions “the principal has to offer a contract 
to the agent and can choose between two different types of contract. 
The agent has to offer a transfer from the range [0; 120] or a transfer 
from the range [10; 120]”. Obviously the two instructions promote 
two different social contexts. However, as the instructions exactly 
describe the same rules of game, the needs for competence and 
relatedness should be quite equally satisfied by both instructions. But 
the need for autonomy which is the most crucial need in the general 
causality orientation might be differently touched by both 
instructions. Using the FK-instructions, the wording “not to limit the 
agent and to leave him completely free to decide” implies an 
accentuation on choice and freedom rather than on control and 
therefore clearly addresses an individual’s need for autonomy.14 So 
the agents’ need for autonomy seems to be more satisfied if the 
                                                 
13 Original instructions are in German, translation by the author. The expression 
used in the German version is “zwingen”. 
 
14 The “emphasis on choice rather than control” has been detected as one of three 
specific factors leading to greater internalization of extrinsic motivation (Deci et 
al. 1994). 
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principal does not ask for a transfer of at least 10 points. As the 
wording in our own instructions is more unemotional, the need for 
autonomy is not activated in the same way. Hence, the principal’s 
decision to control appears in a more neutral and rational manner.  
The SDT can help to explain why agents voluntarily give a 
higher transfer if they are not controlled. These agents are controlled 
motivated having not taken in the regulation. But even more, the 
SDT can help to explain why agents give a higher transfer in the 
control-case and why this transfer is higher than the minimum 
transfer of 10 points. Those agents are autonomous motivated who 
have identified with the regulation. 
 
 
3.2.2 Social Loafing 
 
The approaches mentioned above might help to explain the 
impact of control on agents’ behavior, but they do not serve as 
theoretical background to explain agents’ motivation in the team 
treatments. Therefore we have to extend our theoretical framework. 
Due to the experimental design that eliminates any interaction 
between the agents, we have to distinguish groups who work 
collectively from those who work coactively. Working coactively 
also means working in the presence of others, but in contrast to 
collectively working agents whose inputs are connected within their 
group, coactively working agents’ inputs are not combined with the 
inputs of the other agents of their group (Karau/Williams 1993). For 
this reason we do not expect free riding as mentioned in the 
introduction, because it presumes the existence of collectively 
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working groups.15 To analyze the impact of increasing groups on 
agents’ behavioral reaction to the restriction of the choice set, we 
therefore focus on the psychological phenomenon called social 
loafing. “Formally, social loafing is the reduction in motivation and 
effort when individuals work collectively compared with when they 
work individually or coactively” (Karau/Williams 1993: 681). There 
are several theoretical accounts for social loafing. In the following, 
we concentrate on three main causes that seem to be the most 
appropriate for our design. 
First, one reason for the effect of social loafing is the lack of 
identifiability of people’s performance (Latané et al. 1979, 
Jackson/Harkins 1985, Williams et al. 1981). People feel that they 
can “hide in the crowd” (Davis 1969) and therefore do not risk to be 
blamed when being detected withholding effort. In the context of our 
experiment, agents should feel less motivated in the team treatments. 
They know that their transfer cannot be assigned to them by the 
principal because first, the agent whose transfer decision will be 
responsible for the principal’s payoff is randomly chosen and 
therefore the probability to be chosen decreases to one out of three 
respectively one out of nine in the team treatments. And second, 
even if an agent is the selected one in the end of the experiment, due 
to the anonymity of the lab experiment the principal will never get to 
know him face-to-face. 
A second reason could be the so called “effort matching” 
(Latané et al. 1979, Kerr 1983, Jackson/Harkins 1985). According to 
this, people match their effort for equity or fairness reasons. When 
one’s partner is hardly working, one would be a “sucker” to work 
hard himself reducing one’s own payoff (Kerr 1983). Thus, in our 
                                                 
15 A differentiation between shirking, social loafing and free riding from 
psychological and economic points of view is given by Kidwell/Bennett (1993). 
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experiment, if agents believe that the other agents will loaf and only 
give small transfers to the principal, they give small transfers 
themselves. In comparison to the other agents none of the agents 
might want to be the only one giving a lot of points to the principal 
which immediately reduces the agent’s own payoff. Again, this effect 
might be intensified by the anonymity and the stranger matching in 
the experimental procedure, because “there is no reason for them to 
have faith in the group” (Jackson/Harkins 1985: 1200). 
A third reason for the social loafing could be the “dispensability 
of effort” (Karau/Williams 1993, Kerr/Bruun 1983, Kerr 1983). 
People’s motivation might be reduced if they feel that their effort is 
not essential for the whole group product. Even though there is no 
group product in our experiment, agents might feel that their transfer 
is of little value (i.e. dispensable) because, once again, the 
probability to be the selected agent whose transfer decision applies 
for the principal’s payoff decreases in the team treatments. Even 
more, agents could feel that giving a high transfer is like wasting 
money, because the probability that no one will benefit from a 
generous transfer is quite high. 
 
 
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
 
In line with the theoretical background of the Self-
Determination Theory we derive our first presumption. Apart from 
amotivated agents who only give the minimum amount of 0 without 
control and 10 with control, there should be a substantial amount of 
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motivated agents. Controlled motivated agents have not taken in the 
given constraint. They dishonor the distrust implied by the restriction 
of the choice set and therefore would give a higher transfer if they 
are not controlled. Corresponding to this, agents who are autonomous 
motivated have identified with the given regulation. They would give 
a higher transfer if the principal decides to control. 
 
Presumption 3.1: 
In all treatments, there should be a substantial amount of agents who 
voluntarily give a transfer superior to the minimum amount of 0 
respectively 10. 
 
Regarding the differences between the single-agent and the 
team treatments, we refer to the phenomenon of social loafing. We 
expect the agents to feel less responsible for the principal’s payoff in 
the team treatments which might reduce their motivation to give high 
transfers. Adapted from the theoretical considerations from section 
3.2, we derive our next presumption: 
 
Presumption 3.2: 
We expect lower average transfers in the team treatments as in the 
single-agent treatment. Transfers decrease with an increasing size of 
group. 
 
Presumption 3.2 just concerns the differences between the 
single-agent and team treatments. In the next step we focus on 
differences within the team treatments, because the main issue of our 
study affects agents’ behavioral reaction to the restriction of the 
choice set in the team treatments. Therefore we have to combine the 
self-determination theory with the phenomenon of social loafing. As 
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already mentioned, the effect of social loafing is a well-known issue 
which might occur due to a change in the context between the 
treatments. Hence, the principal might expect the agents to loaf in 
the team treatments and decides to control them in order to get at 
least 10 points. On the other side, the agents might expect the 
principal to anticipate the social loafing in teams because they know 
that they will loaf themselves. Presumably, most of the agents would 
have decided to control, too, if they had been assigned to the role of 
a principal. Thus, they understand the principal’s decision. The 
restriction of the choice set appears in a different light to the agents 
if it is directed towards a team of agents and not to a single agent. In 
line with the self-determination theory, one could argue, that agents 
who would be controlled motivated in the single-agent treatment 
might become autonomous motivated in the team treatments. In other 
words, agents who might perceive the restriction of the choice set as 
a kind of distrust in the single-agent treatment and therefore decide 
to give a lower transfer in the case with control might change their 
point of view in the team treatments giving a higher transfer in the 
case when the principal controls. 
 
Presumption 3.3: 
In both team treatments, we expect the agents’ average transfer to be 
higher if the principal decides to impose a lower bound to the 
transfer actions of the agent. 
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3.4 Experimental Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics at the University of Cologne in May and 
December 2006 and January 2007. 176 participants had been 
recruited via the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004), 
all of them students of different faculties of the University of 
Cologne. 60 participants took part in the base treatment with one 
principal and one agent, 56 participants in the team treatment 
consisting of one principal and three agents and 60 participants in the 
team treatment with one principal and nine agents per group. None of 
the students took part in more than one session. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher 
1999). All sessions were played one-shot and lasted about thirty 
minutes. Students left the laboratory with an average payoff of 11€.  
Our control treatment which is exactly the same as the base 
treatment of Falk/Kosfeld is a two-stage game with one principal and 
one agent. While the principal has no endowment, the agent starts 
with an endowment of 120 in the experimental currency “Taler” 
which is converted into Euro at the end of the game with an 
exchange rate of 0.1 €/Taler. 
In the beginning the participants are randomly assigned to the 
role of a principal or an agent or – according to the neutral 
formulation in the experimental design – player A or player B. The 
principal has to decide which type of contract he wants to offer to the 
agent. In the first contract the agent has to choose a transfer x  
between [0, 1, …, 120] while in the second contract he has to give a 
transfer x  between [10, 11, …, 120]. Thereby, with the choice of 
contract 2 the principal can minimize his risk by forcing the agent to 
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give at least a transfer of 10x = . The principal’s payoff-function is 
given by 2P xπ =  and the agent’s by 120A xπ = − . As we used the 
strategy method, the agent chooses simultaneously to the principal’s 
decision making the amount of x  he wants to give for each contract 
type. When all participants have made their choices, the principal’s 
decision is announced and the game is finished. After this, the 
students have to answer some questions concerning their age, gender 
or field and state of study.  
In two further treatments we look at one principal and several 
agents, running one treatment with three and another treatment with 
nine agents per group. Now the principal has to decide for the whole 
group whether he wants to control or not. Neither treatment allows 
for any interaction between the agents. Every agent makes his own 
transfer decisions for both cases, being controlled or not. In the end 
of the experiment, one agent per group is randomly chosen to realize 
the principal’s payoff. The principal gets twice the amount the 
randomly chosen agent decided to offer while the agents’ payoffs 
depend on each agent’s individual transfer decisions.  
As mentioned above, the negative effect of control as shown by 
Falk/Kosfeld is at least partly due to the framing in the instructions. 
In order to control for the impact of the framing we therefore 
repeated the team treatments with both instructions.16 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 A comparison of the major differences between the instructions is shown in 
table 3.1 in appendix 3.A. 
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3.5 Experimental Evidence 
 
In the following section we focus on the results obtained by 
using our own instructions. Therefore we start our investigations by 
regarding the average transfers. As shown in figure 3.1, obviously in 
all treatments and in both conditions the transfers exceed the 
required minimum level of 0 respectively 10 Taler. 
 
Result 3.1: 
In all treatments, there is a substantial number of motivated agents 
who voluntarily offer a higher transfer as the required minimum. 
 
In the next step we concentrate on differences between the 
single-agent and the multiple-agents settings. Therefore we call the 
single-agent treatment T(1), the team treatment with three agents 
T(3) and the team treatment with nine agents T(9).  
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Figure 3.1: Average transfers per treatment 
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     [Note: N = 30 observations in T(1) and T(9), 28 observations in T(3)] 
 
 
Average transfers decrease with an increasing number of team 
members in both conditions, with and without control. In the no-
control case this is significant between T(1) and T(9) and between 
T(3) and T(9) (Mann-Whitney U-test, one-tailed, exact, both 
p=0.037) while in the control case the difference is only significant 
between T(1) and T(9) (Mann-Whitney U-test, one-tailed, exact, 
p=0.019). While in T(1) and T(3) in both conditions agents give in 
average a transfer above the threshold of 10 Taler, in T(9) average 
transfer in the no-control condition even falls down to 6.67 Taler. 
Hence, the impact of the size of group is essentially seen by 
comparing T(1) and T(9) where the number of agents per group 
arises from one to nine agents. Furthermore, we find a significant 
order in the medians between the three treatments (Jonckheere-Test, 
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two-tailed, exact, p=0.039 without control and p=0.033 with control). 
Median transfers are highest in T(1) and lowest in T(9). 
 
Result 3.2: 
Average transfers are lower in the team treatments as in the single-
agent treatment. The bigger the group, the lower are the given 
transfers. 
 
To analyze the impact of control within treatments we compare 
the averages between the control and no-control conditions. Figure 
3.1 shows that in each treatment the average transfers with control 
exceed average transfers without control. These differences are 
highly significant in all treatments (Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-
tailed, exact, p<0.001 in all treatments). 
However, it might be necessary to control for the constrained 
nature of the choice set. In the constrained choice set, agents have to 
give at least 10 Taler, but in the unconstrained choice set they are 
allowed to give less than 10 Taler. It might be interesting to check 
whether the differences between the two conditions just appear for 
mathematical reasons. Therefore, we truncate the unconstrained 
choices to 10 by setting all transfers smaller than 10 equal to 10. If 
agents only give higher transfers in the control condition because 
they are forced to, there should be no difference in the distribution 
between the truncated unconstrained choices and the constrained 
choices. In fact, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
between both conditions in all treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test). This leads to our third result: 
 
 
 
  
 
65
Result 3.3: 
We observe benefits of control in each treatment. Average transfers 
with control exceed average transfers without control. 
 
Next, we want to investigate whether the influence of the 
restriction of the choice set on agents’ behavior changes between the 
treatments. We examine the differences in transfers between the 
control and no-control condition by subtracting the transfer without 
control from the transfer with control per subject. The resulting 
variable should be negative if the agent’s reaction to control is 
negative, i.e. the agent would be willing to offer a higher transfer if 
he was not controlled. According to this, if an agent gives a higher 
transfer with as without control, the resulting variable is positive. 
Figure 3.2 shows that in each treatment most of the agents give a 
higher transfer in the control condition. 
 
Figure 3.2: Agents’ reaction to the restriction of the choice set 
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The fraction of agents who are willing to give voluntarily more 
if they are not controlled is quite small and decreases from 13.33% 
in T(1) up to 5.56% in T(9). In contrast, the fraction of agents who 
offer higher transfers in the control condition increases from 73.33% 
in T(1) up to 85.19% in T(9). In each treatment, there are highly 
significant more agents giving higher transfers in the control 
condition compared to those who give less or equal transfers without 
control. (Binomialtest, two-tailed, p=0.016 in T(1), p=0.008 in T(3) 
and p=0.000 in T(9)). However, the distribution of agents’ reaction 
does not significantly differ between the treatments (Fisher’s test, 
exact).17 
 
Result 3.4: 
We observe no change in the influence of control on agents’ behavior 
in bigger groups. 
 
 
 
3.6 Robustness of Results  
 
As mentioned in the introduction the results of the single-agent 
treatment using our own instructions contradict those of FK’s base 
treatment. We were not able to replicate the negative effect of the 
principal’s decision to restrict the agent’s choice set on agents’ 
motivation. As we have shown in chapter 2, this effect is at least 
partly due to the specific wording used in the instructions. Hence, we 
also run both team treatments with the original FK-instructions 
                                                 
17 A detailed overview of agents’ reaction to control is given in table 3.2 in 
appendix 3.B. 
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which were slightly adapted to the team context. In the previous 
section we presented our experimental results disregarding the 
impact of the instructions. Now we analyze the results from the team 
treatments obtained by using the FK-instructions. Figure 3.3 gives an 
overview of the average transfers. 
 
Figure 3.3: Average transfers per treatment using FK-instructions 
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          [Note: N = 30 observations in T(1) and T(9), 28 observations in T(3)] 
 
 
Again, average transfers decrease with an increasing number of 
team members in both conditions. This time, with and without 
control these differences are significant between T(1) and T(3) 
(Mann-Whitney U-Test, one-tailed, exact, p<0.01 with and without 
control) and between T(1) and T(9) (Mann-Whitney U-Test, one-
tailed, exact, p<0.01 with and without control), but there are no 
significant differences between the two team treatments. We find the 
same order in the medians between the three treatments as by using 
  
 
68
our own instructions. Median transfers are highest in T(1) and lowest 
in T(9) with as well as without control (Jonckheere-test, two-tailed, 
exact18, p=0.006 without control and p=0.015 with control). 
 
Result 5: 
Even with the FK-instructions, we observe social loafing in the team 
treatments.  
 
Next, we analyze within treatment differences between the 
control and no-control condition. In contrast to the single-agent 
treatment, in both team treatments, the constrained choices exceed 
the unconstrained choices (T(3): 13.5>11.8, T(9): 13.4>11.1). But 
the only difference which is weakly significant is seen in T(9) 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, exact, p=0.059). Controlling 
for the constrained nature of the choice set, again we set all transfers 
smaller than 10 equal to 10 in the no-control condition which 
addresses 33.33% of the agents in T(1), 50.00% in T(3) and 53.70% 
in T(9). Interestingly, checking the differences with the truncated 
dates in the no-control condition, the differences between the two 
conditions are highly significant in all treatments (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, two-tailed, exact, p<0.01 in all treatments). Furthermore, 
there is a change in the relation of the transfers between the two 
conditions. In all treatments, average transfers are now significantly 
higher in the truncated no-control condition than in the control 
condition, as shown in table 3.3: 
 
                                                 
18 In the no-control condition, we were just able to compute an asymptotic 
Jonckheere-test. 
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Table 3.3: Average transfers per treatment with  
truncated transfers using FK-instructions 
 
 
 
 
To learn more about the relevance of this effect it might be 
helpful to regard agents’ reaction to control by subtracting transfers 
without control from transfers with control per subject which is 
shown in figure 3.4: 19 
 
                                                 
19 A detailed overview of agents’ reaction to control using the FK-instructions is 
given in table 3.4 in appendix 3.C. 
 no control  
[10, 1,…, 120] 
with control 
 [10, 11,…,120] 
1 agent 28.23 19.97 
3 agents 16.02 13.48 
9 agents 16.00 13.39 
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Figure 3.4: Agents’ reaction to the restriction of the  
choice set using FK-instructions 
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            [Note: N = 30 observations in T(1) and T(9), 28 observations in T(3)] 
 
 
This time, the fraction of agents who give higher transfers 
without control decreases from 40.00% in T(1) up to 29.63% in T(9), 
while the fraction of those agents willing to give a higher transfer in 
the control condition increases from 36.67% in T(1) to 59.26% in 
T(9). But in none of the treatments the part of agents giving a higher 
transfer with control significantly exceeds the part of agents giving 
more or equal in the no-control condition (Binomial-test). However, 
using the same test while dropping those agents who react 
indifferently in both conditions leads to a significant difference in 
T(9) (Binomial-test, two-tailed, p=0.029). Furthermore, we only 
observe one significant difference between the treatments, namely 
the part of agents giving higher transfers with control between T(1) 
and T(9) (Fisher’s test, one-tailed, exact, p=0.039). But despite of 
the weak significances, in T(1) the share of agents with a negative 
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behavioral pattern with respect to control exceeds the share of agents 
with a positive behavioral pattern, while this relation changes in the 
team treatments. Now there are more agents who are willing to give 
higher transfers in the control condition as in the no-control 
condition, which is comparable to result 3.2 from section 3.5. 
However, in all treatments, more than 90% of those agents who 
give higher transfers with control also give a transfer that is lower 
than 10 in the no-control condition. Hence, the part of positively 
reacting agents to control is drastically reduced by truncating the 
distribution.20 Now there are more agents who give higher transfers 
without control compared to those who give higher transfers with 
control which leads to higher average transfers in the no-control 
condition. These differences are highly significant in all treatments 
(Binomial-test, two-tailed, p<0.01 in all treatments). Dropping again 
those agents who react equally in both conditions after the truncation 
still leads to significant differences (Binomial-test, two-tailed, 
p=0.035 in T(1), p=0.021 in T(3) and p=0.027 in T(9)). 
 
Result 3.6: 
Using the FK-instructions, we observe a tendency of hidden costs of 
control in the single-agent treatment, because agents dishonor the 
principal’s decision to restrict their choice set. However, this 
motivational effect disappears with an increasing group size. We 
observe benefits of control in teams. 
                                                 
20 Most of those agents who give a transfer below 10 in the no-control condition 
choose a transfer equal to 10 in the control condition. In particular, there are 
93.44% in T(1), 95.24% in T(3) and 96.30% in T(9). Hence, most of the agents 
who react positively to control (giving 10 points in the control condition and 
lower than 10 in the no-control condition) give 10 points in both conditions after 
the truncation. 
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3.7 Discussion 
 
In this study we analyze the influence of control on agents’ 
motivation in a team situation. Therefore we designed a simple 
experimental game following Falk/Kosfeld (2006) where the 
treatments differ in the size of the group of agents. We conducted 
one treatment with one agent (which is a replication of FK’s base 
treatment), one with three agents per group and one with nine agents. 
As we did not implement a team-based compensation we avoided any 
free-riding problem. While the principal’s profit was realized by 
selecting the decision of one randomly chosen agent per group, each 
agent’s payoff just depended on his own decision-making.  
The major objective of our study was to test whether the 
relevance of control defined as the principal’s decision to set a 
minimum required transfer to the agents also holds in a team 
situation. The results show that agents in a team do not reduce their 
transfers as an effect of a loss in motivation which might be due to 
the principal’s decision to control. Furthermore, we show that 
control is even more effective in larger groups because agents’ 
transfer decreases systematically with an increasing group size. 
As described in section 3.2, we try to explain agents’ behavioral 
reaction in the team treatments with the phenomenon of social 
loafing. Thus, drawing on the psychological literature a loss in 
motivation and effort might occur because of a lack of identifiability 
of agents’ performance, dispensability of their effort or because of 
the so called effort matching where agents reduce their effort for 
equity or fairness reasons. While the differences between the 
treatment with one agent and the team treatment with three agents 
are not statistically significant, differences are significant between 
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the extreme treatments with one and nine agents. Using the FK-
instructions, we even find significant differences between one and 
three agents as well as between one and nine agents. This shows that 
indeed the size of group significantly influences agents’ motivation. 
Even more, there seems to be no influence of the kind of instructions 
on agents’ behavioral reaction in the multiple-agents treatments. 
The findings in the present paper offer a rationale for the 
presence of control by supervisors. Even if there are approximately 
as many agents giving higher transfers with control as those giving 
higher transfers without control, the majority of agents in our 
experimental study just give the minimum required transfers. Nearly 
45% of all agents give a transfer of 0 in the no-control condition and 
a transfer of 10 in the control condition. Even more, a loss in effort 
as a consequence of a loss in agents’ motivation in teams seems to be 
avoidable by setting extrinsic motivators. Control as a mechanism to 
make team performance more efficient seems to be indispensable. 
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3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
 
3.A: Comparison of instructions 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of instructions 
Instructions used by Falk/Kosfeld Own instructions  
Before participant A decides how many 
points he wants to give to B, B can set 
a minimum transfer. Concretely, 
participant B is able to force 
participant A to give him at least 10 
points. But he can also decide not to 
limit participant A and to leave him 
completely free to decide. So there are 
two cases: 
 
Case 1: Participant B forces participant 
A to transfer at least 10 points. In this 
case, participant A can transfer any 
amount between 10 and 120 to B. 
 
Case 2: Participant B leaves participant 
A free to decide and does not force him 
to transfer at least 10 points. In this 
case, participant A can transfer any 
amount between 0 and 120 to B. 
Player A offers a contract to player B. 
He can choose between two different 
types of contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract 1: Player B has to offer a 
transfer from the range of [0; 120]. 
 
 
 
Contract 2: Player B has to offer a 
transfer from the range of [10; 120]. 
 
[Note: Original instructions are both in German, translation by the author]. 
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3.B: Agents’ reaction to control using own instructions 
 
Table 3.2: Agents’ reaction to control using own instructions 
 
1 Agent 3 Agents 9 Agents 
 
 Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative
Number 
of agents 
 
22 4 4 30 8 4 46 5 3 
Relative 
share 
 
0.73 0.13 0.13 0.71 0.19 0.10 0.85 0.09 0.06 
Average 
x if 
controlled 
 
18.73 23.75 18.75 14.30 21.25 26.25 10.80 30.00 38.33 
Average 
x if not 
controlled 
7.59 23.75 27.50 4.50 21.25 41.25 1.20 30.00 51.67 
 
 
 
 
3.C: Agents’ reaction to control using FK-instructions 
 
Table 3.4: Agents’ reaction to control using FK-instructions 
 
1 Agent 3 Agents 9 Agents 
 
 Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative
Number 
of agents 
 
11 7 12 22 7 13 32 6 16 
Relative 
share 
 
0.37 0.23 0.40 0.52 0.17 0.31 0.59 0.11 0.30 
Average 
x if 
controlled 
 
12.91 36.43 16.83 11.95 21.43 11.77 11.28 22.50 14.19 
Average 
x if not 
controlled 
4.18 36.43 38.08 3.14 21.43 21.38 2.34 22.50 24.50 
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3.D: Experimental Instructions (own version) 
 
(Note: Original instructions are in German. Expressions in brackets 
are just shown in the team treatments.) 
 
Periods and Parts 
 
- The experiment takes one period. 
- You will form a group with another player [with three (nine) 
other players], so that every group consists of two [four (ten)] 
players. However you will not know the identity of the other 
group member[s]. 
- The members of one group will adopt different parts: There is 
one Player A and one [three (nine)] Player[s] B. These parts 
will be randomly assigned to each participant at the beginning 
of the experiment. 
 
Course of Period 
 
Decision of Player A 
 
- Player A offers a contract to [each] Player B. He can choose 
between two different types of contracts: 
o Contract type I: [Each] Player B has to offer a transfer 
from the range of [0;120] 
o Contract type II: [Each] Player B has to offer a transfer 
from the range of [10;120] 
Decision of Player B 
 
- At the same time, [each] Player B will specify his transfer for 
each type of contract depending on Player A’s decision of 
choosing contract type I or II. So [every] Player B will specify 
his possible transfers within the given interval of each type of 
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contract, before he will be informed about Player A’s decision 
on contract type I or II. 
Transfers may only be specified in form of whole numbers. 
- The pay-outs will only be determined by Player B’s transfer 
for the type of contract, which is actually chosen by Player A. 
Realization of Profits 
 
- Only after [all] Player[s] B has [have] specified his [their] 
individual transfers for each type of contract, Player A’s 
actual decision on the type of contract will be announced. 
- [Each] Player B’s profit will consist of his starting capital of 
120 Taler minus his transfer for the type of contract 
previously chosen by Player A. 
o Profit for [each] Player B= 120-transfer 
- [Player A’s profit will be determined by the decision of one 
randomly chosen Player B of the same group]. Player A will 
receive the double amount of [this randomly chosen] Player 
B’s transfer for the type of contract previously chosen by 
Player A. 
o Profit for Player A = 2 x transfer of [one random] 
Player B [of the same group] 
 
Starting Capital and Final Pay-out 
 
- At the beginning of this experiment every Player B will be 
provided with a starting capital in form of the experimental 
currency of 120 Taler. Players A will not receive any starting 
capital. At the end of this experiment every participant will 
receive his achieved profit converted into Euros with an 
exchange rate of 0,10 € for one Taler. Additionally, every 
participant will receive a show up fee of 2,50 €. 
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Important Instructions: 
 
- No communications will be allowed except via the 
experimental software. 
- All decisions will be anonymous, so that no other participant 
will be able to link a decision to any other participant. 
- The pay-out will also be anonymous, so that no participant 
will find out the pay-out of any other participant. 
- The instructions will be collected after the experiment is 
finished.  
 
Good luck. 
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3.E: Experimental Instructions (Falk/Kosfeld version) 
 
(Note: Original instructions are in German. Expressions in brackets 
are just shown in the team treatments.) 
 
You are about to take part in an economic experiment, which is 
financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 
Please read the instructions carefully. Everything you need to 
know for this experiment will be explained to you. In case you have 
any questions, please notify so. Your questions will be answered at 
your desk. All other communication is strictly forbidden throughout 
the whole experiment. 
At the beginning of the experiment, every participant will 
receive a show up fee of 2.50 €. You will be able to earn additional 
points during the experiment. All points earned during the 
experiment will be converted into Euros at the end of the experiment. 
The exchange rate is the following: 
 
 
1 point = 10 Cent 
 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your income, which 
you have earned during the experiment, plus the 2.50 € show up fee 
in cash. 
 
The Experiment 
 
In this experiment one [three (nine)] participant[s] A and one 
participant B will form a group of two [four (ten)]. No participant 
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will know the other member[s] of his group, so all decisions will be 
made anonymously. 
 
You are participant A (B). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment every participant A will receive 
120 points. Participant B will not receive any points. 
 
Decision of participant A: 
 
[Every] participant A can choose, how many points he wants to 
transfer to participant B. Every point transferred from A to B will be 
doubled by the experimenters. Every point transferred from A to B 
therefore decreases A’s income by one point and increases B’s 
income by two points. [To determine participant B’s earnings the 
decision from one participant A out of the group of four (ten) will be 
randomly picked.] 
The formula for the earnings look like this: 
 
Earning of participant[s] A: 120 – transfer 
 
 
 
Earnings of participant B: 0 + 2*transfer [of one randomly 
picked participant A of the same group] 
 
 
The following examples will clarify the formulas for the earnings: 
Example 1: [The randomly picked] A transfers 0 points to B. The 
earnings will be 120 for A and 0 for B. 
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Example 2: [The randomly picked] A transfers 20 points to B. The 
earnings will be 100 for A and 40 for B. 
Example 3: [The randomly picked] A transfers 80 points to B. The 
earnings will be 40 for A and 160 for B. 
 
Decision of participant B: 
 
B can determine a minimum transfer, before [every] participant A 
has chosen, how many points he wants to transfer to participant B. In 
particular, participant B could force [all of his] participant[s] A to 
transfer at least 10 points to B. But participant B can also choose not 
to force [his] participant[s] A to any minimum transfer and thus to 
leave the decision completely free to participant[s] A.  
 
There are two possible cases: 
Case 1: Participant B forces participant[s] A to transfer at least 10 
points to B. In this case [each] participant A may transfer any whole 
numbered amount between 10 and 120 to B. 
Case 2: Participant B leaves the decision free to participant[s] A and 
does not force him [them] to transfer at least 10 points to B. In this 
case, participant[s] A may transfer any amount between 0 and 120 to 
B. 
 
The experiment therefore consists of two steps: 
Step 1: 
In the first step, participant B decides, either to force participant[s] 
A to a minimum transfer of 10 points or to leave free the decision on 
the amount to be transferred. [B has to make the same decision for 
all three (nine) participants A of his group. So he either forces all 
three (nine) participants A or he lets all three (nine) A’s decide 
freely.] 
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Step 2: 
In the second step [every] A decides on the amount which he wants 
to transfer to B. This may be an amount between 
- 10 and 120, in case B has forced participant[s] A to 
transfer at least 10 points to B. 
or 
- 0 and 120, in case B has not forced participant[s] A to 
transfer at least 10 points to B. 
 
After [every] participant A has decided on how many points he wants 
to transfer to B [one participant A out of the group of four (ten) will 
be randomly picked. This participant A’s decision on the amount 
transferred to B determines participant’s B earnings] the experiment 
is over. 
 
(Note: the following part is only contained in the instructions for 
participant A. Participant B received the instructions, “The decisions 
of A and B will be entered on the monitors at the computers.”) 
 
Please take notice: As participant A you have to decide on the 
amount to be transferred to B before you know, whether B does 
force you to transfer at least 10 points or whether he does not [and 
before you know, whether your decision will be chosen to determine 
B’s earnings]. This means, you have to make two decisions. You will 
submit your decision through the following screen: 
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You are participant A. 
 
You have 120 points. Participant B has 0 points. 
You may transfer points to participant B. 
Every single point you transfer, will be doubled by the 
experimenters. 
 
Case 1: In case, Participant B forces you to a minimum transfer of 10 
points: 
How many points do you transfer in this case?    x points 
 
Case 2: In case, Participant B leaves the decision completely to you: 
How many points do you transfer in this case?    x points 
 
So you will specify how many points you will transfer to B, in case 
B forces you to transfer a at least 10 points (case 1) and in case B 
leaves the decision to your free choice (case 2). 
Which of the two decisions is relevant for the payout, will be 
determined by B’s decision. In case B forces you to transfer him at 
least 10 points, your decision specified for case 1 will count. In case 
B leaves the decision to your free choice the amount of points 
specified for case 2 will count.  
 
(Note: From here on, there are again identical instructions for both 
participants.) 
 
A screen at the end of the experiment will inform you about the 
decisions made and the earnings resulting from these decisions. 
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Your earned points will be exchanged into Euros and paid out to you 
in cash, together with the show up fee. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Please solve the following control questions. The answers have no 
consequences on your earnings. Their only purpose is to check that 
every participant has understood the rules of the experiment. 
 
Question 1: Assumed participant B leaves the decision to participant 
A. A transfers 22 points to participant B. What are their earnings? 
  
Question 2: Assumed participant B forces participant A to transfer at 
least 10 points to B. A transfers 12 points to participant B. What are 
their earnings? 
  
Question 3: Assumed participant B leaves the decision to participant 
A. A transfers 6 points to participant B. What are their earnings? 
  
[Question 1: Assumed participant B leaves the decision to 
participants A. The first A transfers 22 points, the second A 30 
points and the third A 10 points to participant B. The first A’s 
decision is randomly picked to determine participant B’s earning. 
What are their earnings?] 
  
[Question 2: Assumed participant B forces participants A to transfer 
at least 10 points to B. The first A transfers 20 points, the second A 
12 points and the third A 30 points to participant B. The second A’s 
decision is randomly picked to determine participant B’s earning. 
What are their earnings?] 
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[Question 3: Assumed participant B leaves the decision to 
participants A. The first A transfers 15 points, the second A 25 
points and the third A 6 points to participant B. The third A’s 
decision is randomly picked to determine participant B’s earning. 
What are their earnings?] 
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Coordination 
Devices on Team Performance 21 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
The productivity of teams is an interesting issue in research that 
has been investigated many times before. A lot of laboratory 
experiments have been conducted in order to analyze how teams 
react and how they can be motivated (see e.g. Colman 1995, 
Davis/Holt 1993, Fehr/Gächter 2000b, Ledyard 1995, 
Nalbantian/Schotter 1997, Sally 1995). With this study we want to 
contribute to this field of research by investigating the impact of 
different types of coordination devices on agents’ behavioral pattern 
in a team situation. 
                                                 
21 This chapter is based on Gerlach/Gerlach (2007). 
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The crucial point of many studies is the possibility of free-
riding and shirking which is immanent to a typical team or public 
goods situation. Most often it is only the collective team 
performance that can be observed and not each member’s individual 
performance. Therefore, one could benefit from the other team 
members’ contribution without being detected while shirking. Even 
if people start by voluntarily giving more than the minimum input, 
once they have been exploited by their team they start shirking 
themselves. John O. Ledyard (1995) for example shows that in a 
typical public goods situation which is often compared to a team 
situation, in the beginning people give approximately 50% of the 
pareto optimal contribution. In a repeated experiment this 
contribution decreases to 11% in the end. Thus, a major problem in 
team situations is a coordination dilemma between the team 
members. Even though everyone could be better off by cooperating, 
no one wants to risk being exploited by potential free-riders and 
therefore gives less than the team best contribution himself. 
Issues to reduce free-riding in teams often focus on the 
implementation of different incentive schemes (Holmström 1982), 
such as target based schemes, tournament based schemes or several 
forms of gain- or profit-sharing (Nalbantian/Schotter 1997). The 
problem is that extrinsically motivated people reduce shirking 
because of the expected incentive. If the incentive does not hold any 
longer – for example after a tournament is finished – people tend to 
start shirking again. Furthermore, external factors such as tangible 
rewards, deadlines or monitoring might undermine intrinsic 
motivation and reduce the motivation to contribute in a whole (Deci 
1975, Fehr/Gächter 2002). 
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In this study we conduct a principal-agent lab experiment with 
teams consisting of one principal and three agents. The agents have 
to provide a contribution to a team product. The principal has to 
offer to his team one out of three types of contracts. These three 
contracts differ in the range from which the agents have to choose 
their contribution. The limitations of the ranges in the three contracts 
are chosen according to the Nash equilibrium contribution, the team 
best contribution and the first best contribution.  
Contract 1 offers the highest liberty of action to the agents, but 
it does not give any support to reduce the team’s coordination 
problem.  
Contract 2 offers a range of contribution that is limited above 
compared to contract 1. The idea of this contract is to take into 
account that in addition to the issue of their coordination problem 
agents might also pay attention to the principal’s intention when 
offering a contract. By choosing contract 2, the principal can 
signalize that he is willing to refrain from very high contributions 
that would be beneficial for the principal but not for the agents 
themselves. Thus, this decision might be perceived as a kind action 
that could be rewarded by reciprocal agents. However, this contract 
does not limit the opportunity to free-ride. Even though the principal 
offers some support to the agents to find their optimal contribution, 
this device does not reduce the coordination dilemma between the 
agents.  
In contrast to the first two contracts, contract 3 offers a range of 
contribution that is limited below. Choosing this contract, the 
principal gives assistance to the agents to reduce their coordination 
problem. Since agents are forced to give at least a certain minimum 
contribution, they are protected from each other. If an agent wants to 
exploit the others by providing a very low contribution, this 
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willingness to free-ride is restricted to the lower limit of contract 3. 
Agents do not risk that the other team members give nothing at all, 
they can be sure to get a certain minimum output. For this reason 
agents might risk to give a higher contribution as in the two other 
contracts. Hence, offering contract 3 could be interpreted as a 
supporting coordination device given by the principal. However, in 
line with our argumentation from contract 2, it might be that agents 
do not appreciate being forced to provide a requested minimum 
contribution and therefore might perceive the principal’s decision as 
an unkind action that should be punished by providing less.22  
Hence, there are two oppositional effects that might influence 
agents’ contribution. However, as the agents’ payoff is mainly 
determined by the coordination dilemma, we expect the agents to pay 
low attention to the principal’s underlying intention by offering 
contract 2 or 3. 
While in the first treatment the agents do not have the 
opportunity to communicate with each other, we implement a chat-
software in a second treatment to allow for a discussion between the 
agents in a team. As the communication is not binding in our 
experiment and as there is no change in the parameters of the 
experiment, the agents’ contribution decisions should not be 
influenced by the communication. However, several studies show 
that the contribution rate in a team situation is strongly and 
positively influenced by the opportunity to communicate (e.g. Brosig 
2002, Brosig et al. 2003, Brosig et al. 2004, Harbring 2006, 
Hoffmann et al. 1996, Isaac/Walker 1988). 
 
                                                 
22 See also Falk/Kosfeld (2006) who find a significant negative impact of setting 
a minimum restriction in a situation with one principal and one agent. 
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Our results show that giving a supporting coordination device to 
a team by limiting the opportunity to free-ride increases the average 
team performance. Agents’ average contribution in contract 3 
significantly outperforms the average contributions given in the other 
contracts and is also significantly higher than the requested minimum 
contribution. In contrast, the impact of the principal’s underlying 
intention by choosing a certain contract seems to be negligible in this 
context. Apart from that, we show that communication does not 
change the impact of the coordination device on agents’ behavioral 
patterns. Even though the average contribution rate with 
communication is higher in all contracts, agents still spend the 
highest contribution if their range of contribution is limited below. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 4.2 and 4.3 we 
present the experimental design and theoretical predictions. After 
this we report our empirical results in section 4.4. Section 4.5 deals 
with the impact of communication and section 4.6 with the influence 
of good and bad experiences on agents’ behavior. The paper 
concludes in section 4.7. 
  
 
 
4.2 Experimental Design 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics at the University of Cologne. The 
participants were recruited with the online recruiting system ORSEE 
(Greiner 2004). 112 students of all branches of study were spread 
over four sessions: two sessions for the treatment with chat and two 
sessions for the treatment without chat. Each candidate was only 
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allowed to participate in one session, which consisted of seven 
periods and lasted about one hour and a half. In the end, one 
randomly chosen payoff of one of the seven periods was relevant for 
the payment. The average payoff was 14.20 €. During the 
experiment, the payoffs were given in the experimental currency 
Taler. At the end of the experiment, one Taler was converted into 
Euro by an exchange rate of 0.23 € per Taler23 that was announced in 
advance. 
The participants were randomly assigned as principal or as 
agent or - according to the neutral formulation of the experimental 
instructions - as player A and player B and did not change their role 
during the whole experiment. They were also randomly assigned to 
groups consisting of one principal and three agents. After each 
period the composition of each group was changed so that none of 
the participants met twice. Each agent started with an endowment of 
35 Taler and each principal with an endowment of 20 Taler. 
Before starting the experiment, the instructions and cost tables 
were distributed and read to all participants and question were 
answered. Via the experimental software the principal then chooses 
one of three different types of contract to offer to the agents. The 
principal has to offer the same contract to all of the three agents. 
Choosing the first contract, each agent has to provide a contribution 
from range [0; 80], choosing the second contract from range [0; 60] 
and choosing the third contract from [20; 80]. As it will be shown in 
the next section, these frameworks are chosen according to the 
agents’ contribution in the Nash equilibrium, the team best 
contribution and the first best contribution of each agent. 
                                                 
23 This exchange-rate was chosen in order to reach approximately the general 
average earning of 12.50 € per hour in the laboratory. 
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Before the agents get to know which type of contract the 
principal actually decides on, they have to make a contribution 
decision for each of the three contracts, so each agent has to make 
three separated contribution decisions. Agents are rewarded on the 
basis of their collective output. The contribution is costly to the 
agents with a cost function of ( ) 2
100
i
i
ec e = . While in the treatment 
without chat, the agents just have to make their decisions without 
talking to their team members, in the treatment with chat, they are 
allowed to discuss via a chat-software about their contributions. This 
communication cannot be observed by the principal. Once an agent 
sends his decisions, he has no longer the possibility to take part in 
the chat but can observe the communication between the remaining 
two agents. The agents can give any contribution within the given 
range of each contract, regardless of what they announce in the chat. 
Because the agents only meet once during the experiment a great 
possibility of free-riding is given.  
After the agents have made their decisions, the principal’s 
decision and the team’s output for the selected contract are revealed. 
In order to take into account the interaction of the agents, we assume 
the following production function: ( ) 3
1
1.5i i
i
f e Y e
=
= = ∑ . The 
principal’s payoff function is given by 
3
1
0.25 1.5P i
i
eπ
=
= ⋅ ∑ , so the 
principal gets a quarter of his team’s output. The agents’ payoff 
function is given by ( )3
1
0.25 1.5Ai i i
i
e c eπ
=
= ⋅ −∑ . After this, the groups 
are rematched and the next period starts.  
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4.3 Theoretical Predictions 
 
In the following section we present our theoretical predictions. 
Because we firstly concentrate on the differences between the three 
kinds of contracts, we disregard the impact of the communication in 
the chat-treatment in this section. The chat will be discussed 
separately in section 4.5.    
The behavioral predictions of our study depend on the 
assumptions concerning players’ preferences. According to the 
economic standard theory, agents are supposed to be selfish and to 
maximize their own material payoff. In this study each agent’s 
payoff depends on his own contribution as well as on the other team 
members’ contributions. Because agents cannot be obliged to what 
they have announced they would give, there should not be any 
cooperation between the agents. As shown below the result is the 
Nash equilibrium, because agents maximize their own profit: 
3
2
1
!
max 0.25 1.5 0.01
0.375 0.02 0
18.75
i
Ai i ie i
i
i
e e
e
e
π
=
= ⋅ − ⋅
⇒ − =
⇔ =
∑
 
 
In the Nash equilibrium, agents would give a contribution of 
18.75ie = . The principal’s and each agent’s payoff would be:  
 
   ( )2
0.25 1.5 3 18.75 21.09
0.25 1.5 3 18.75 0.01 18.75 17.58
P
Ai
π
π
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ =  
 
Hence, we derive our first presumption: 
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Presumption 4.1: 
If agents are selfish, in the first and second contract their 
contribution will be e=18.75. In the third contract where the 
decision is limited below to 20, the contribution will be e=20. 
 
Yet, many empirical studies show that people’s behavior is 
dominated by social preferences instead of being completely selfish. 
By maximizing their own utility they take into account other 
people’s utility as well (see e.g. Andreoni/Miller 1993, 
Bolton/Ockenfels 2000, Fehr/Fischbacher 2002, Fehr/Schmidt 1999, 
Rabin 1993). Therefore, agents might consider that the team is 
rewarded on the collective output. Because the principal just benefits 
from the agents’ contribution and does not have any costs at all, the 
agents’ optimal decision would be the team best contribution, which 
means to maximize the agents’ collective payoff excluding the 
principal’s payoff. In this case, agents’ utility function is: 
3
2
1
!
max 0.75 1.5 0.01
1.125 0.02 0
56.25
i
A i ie i
i
i
e e
e
e
π
=
= ⋅ − ⋅
⇒ − =
⇔ =
∑
 
 
With a team best contribution of 56.25ie = , the payoffs are: 
 
( )2
0.25 1.5 3 56.25 63.28
0.25 1.5 3 56.25 0.01 56.25 31.64
P
Ai
π
π
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ =  
 
However, due to the given free-riding problem we expect the 
agents to give less than the team best contribution of 56.25. As 
shown in many other empirical studies, the majority of individuals 
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are “weak free-riders” in teams. Even if their contribution to the 
group exceeds the Nash-prediction they provide less than the team 
best amount (e.g. Andreoni 1988b, Ledyard 1995, Weimann 1994). 
We derive our second presumption: 
 
Presumption 4.2: 
There is a substantial amount of agents who is not completely selfish 
and also cares about their team partners’ utility. Thus, their 
contribution exceeds the Nash equilibrium. 
 
In the next step, we come to the most interesting point of our 
study by analyzing the impact of the different ranges of contribution 
on agents’ behavioral pattern. While in the first and second 
presumptions we just concentrate on agents’ behavior in a general 
team situation, we now take a look at the influence of the principal’s 
contract decision. If the principal chooses contract 1 with a range of 
[0; 80], he offers the full range of decision to his team. Hence, this 
contract will serve as the base contract to be compared with the 
effect of the two other contracts. 
By choosing the second contract the principal sets an upper 
limit to the agents’ decisions (range of [0; 60]). On the one hand, by 
choosing this contract the principal has the possibility to protect his 
agents from harming themselves by giving a contribution that 
exceeds the team best contribution. Note that the maximum 
contribution of 60ie =  is just slightly above the team best 
contribution of 56.25ie =  but clearly below the first best contribution 
of 75ie = . By providing the first best contribution the collective 
team’s payoff including the principal’s payoff will reach its 
maximum: 
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3
2
1
!
max 1.5 0.01
1.5 0.02 0
75
i
i ie i
i
i
e e
e
e
π
=
= − ⋅
⇒ − =
⇔ =
∑
 
 
In this case, principal and agents will get the following payoffs: 
 
   ( )2
0.25 1.5 3 75 84.375
0.25 1.5 3 75 0.01 75 28.125
P
Ai
π
π
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ =  
 
While the principal’s payoff in the first best situation exceeds 
his payoff in the team best situation, the opposite holds for the 
agents. By giving an upper limit of 60ie = , the principal can point 
out that he cares about his agents’ payoffs. In the agents’ interest he 
is willing to refrain from his maximum payoff in the first best case. 
If agents pay attention to this kind action, they might reciprocate by 
giving a higher contribution as in the other contracts. However, this 
is only one point of view. On the other hand – which to our mind 
should be more important - the second contract does not give any 
support to the agents to reduce their coordination problem, because it 
does not limit the opportunity to free-ride. Even more it reduces the 
chance to get very high contributions (>60) and payoffs. Therefore 
we derive our third presumption: 
 
Presumption 4.3: 
Compared to contract 1, the average contribution will be lower if the 
principal sets an upper limit to the agents in contract 2. 
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Choosing the third contract, the principal restricts the agents’ 
choice by setting a requested minimum contribution. Note that the 
lower limit of 20ie =  is chosen in our experimental design because it 
is just slightly above the Nash equilibrium of 18.75ie = . If the 
principal supposes the agents to be selfish he can ensure a payoff of 
at least 22.5 Taler to himself by preventing the agents from giving 
less than 20. However, if the agents perceive the decision to offer 
contract 3 as an unkind action the principal risks being punished by 
lower contributions compared to the other contracts. But furthermore 
and probably even more important with regard to the agents’ 
coordination dilemma, the principal offers a supporting coordination 
device to his team. By setting the lower limit, even potential free-
riders have to give at least a contribution of 20. The team members 
are protected from each other, because the danger being exploited by 
the others is limited to the given minimum amount. Agents might 
risk providing a higher contribution. 
 
Presumption 4.4: 
Compared to contract 1, the average contribution will be higher if 
the principal offers a supporting coordination device to the agents in 
contract 3 by requesting a minimum contribution of at least 20 Taler. 
 
 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
In this section we present our main empirical findings. 
According to presumption 4.1, agents are supposed to be selfish. As 
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shown in the previous section, the predicted contribution would be 
18.75 in the first and second contract and 20 in the third contract. 
Table 4.1 shows the average and median contributions for the three 
contracts.  
 
Table 4.1: Average and median contributions 
 averages medians 
contract 1 [0;80] 34.14 35 
contract 2 [0;60] 31.94 30 
contract 3 [20;80] 38.49 39 
 
 
The average contribution is clearly higher than the Nash 
equilibrium (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<0.01 for all contracts)24. 
Looking at the percentiles we find supporting evidence for this 
result. For all contracts, 75% of the agents spend more than the 
Nash-prediction.  
 
Result 4.1: 
There is a substantial amount of agents who are not completely 
selfish and who do take into account their team partners’ payoffs.  
 
In presumption 4.2, we consider that agents’ behavior might be 
influenced by social preferences. Agents know that their team is 
rewarded on the collective output and therefore spend more than 
predicted by standard economic theory. If they try to maximize the 
team’s payoff excluding the principal, every agent should give a 
contribution of 56.25ie = . However, table 4.1 reports other results. 
Even if many agents are not completely selfish, most of them are 
                                                 
24 We report all Wilcoxon signed rank tests as two-sided tests. 
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weak free-riders who provide less than the team best contribution. 
For each kind of contract the average contribution is quite in the 
middle between the selfish and the team best amount. Less than 25% 
of all agents give a contribution higher than 50. These dates are 
consistent with other team or public goods experiments showing that 
in a typical public goods situation in the beginning agents spend 
approximately 50% of the pareto optimal effort (Nalbantian/Schotter 
1997, Ledyard 1995). 
Of course, the reported results might be explained by the issue 
of free-riding. Agents cannot be committed to any contribution and 
they only meet once during the whole experiment, so the incentive to 
shirk is quite high. Even if each agent can be better off by 
cooperating, there should be few cooperation because the agents 
hesitate to trust each other. Since contribution is costly, the agents 
try to avoid loosing money. They anticipate that the others will not 
give the team best contribution and therefore spend less than the 
team optimum themselves. As despite of the coordination dilemma 
the average contribution is higher than the Nash equilibrium, we find 
support for the assumption of the influence of social preferences. 
 
Result 4.2: 
Even if most of the agents are not completely selfish, the average 
contribution does not reach the team optimum. 
 
Next we analyze the impact of the different ranges of 
contribution on agents’ behavior. Therefore we compare the average 
contributions between the three types of contracts. Table 4.1 shows 
that the average contribution is highest if agents are bounded below 
(contract 3) and lowest if agents are bounded above (contract 2). 
These differences are highly significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
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p<0.001 between all contracts). However, these results might be due 
to the initial range of possible contributions. Because in contract 2 
the given contribution cannot be higher than 60 and in contract 3 
there are no possible contributions below 20, the averages 
technically might be highest in the third contract. To make these 
averages more comparable, we set all contributions smaller than 20 
equal to 20 and all contributions higher than 60 equal to 60. Hence, 
in all of the three contracts the minimum and maximum possible 
contributions are the same in the modified data. With these modified 
data we get the following results: 
 
Table 4.2: Average contributions with modified data 
 Averages with modified data 
contract 1 [0;80] 35.58 
contract 2 [0;60] 34.38 
contract 3 [20;80] 37.30 
 
 
Although averages are now naturally smaller in contracts 1 and 
3 and higher in contract 2 than in the original data, there seems to be 
no change in the rank. Averages are still highest in contract 3 and 
lowest in contract 2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<0.001 between all 
contracts). 
 
Result 4.3: 
Average contribution is highest if agents are bounded below 
(contract 3) and average contribution is lowest if agents are bounded 
above (contract 2). 
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Apparently, by offering the upper limit in contract 2 the 
principal’s intention to protect the agents from providing too high 
contributions does not matter at all. A reason could be that in all 
periods (see figure 4.1), agents are far away from giving a 
contribution higher than 60, hence the upper limit is not binding and 
does not have any impact. By offering contract 3, however, agents 
seem to agree to the coordination device given by the principal. 
Their motivation to provide is not reduced due to the feeling being 
forced to give at least a certain minimum amount, but they recognize 
that the danger being totally exploited by the other team members is 
reduced. Furthermore, as the requested contribution of 20 is very 
close to the Nash equilibrium of 18.75, from the agents’ point of 
view this might be seen as no drastic limitation.  
 
Figure 4.1: Average contributions per period 
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   [N = 42 observations per period] 
 
 
In the next step we look at agents’ individual reactions to the 
three contracts. As in none of the contracts the average contribution 
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reaches the team optimum, we define the coordination dilemma and 
free-riding to be higher the lower the average contribution per agent. 
We call an agent to favor a certain contract if his contribution in this 
contract exceeds his contributions in the other contracts. Independent 
of the amount of the contribution we check in which contract an 
agent’s average contribution is highest. First, we concentrate on 
contract 1 and contract 2. Figure 4.2 shows that more than half of the 
participants (54.8%) do not differentiate between their contribution 
in contract 1 and contract 2. The part of agents favoring contract 1 
(40.5%) is nearly ten times as high as the part of agents favoring 
contract 2 (4.8%). However, this difference is statistically not 
significant (Binomial-test, two-tailed, p=0.109).  
 
Figure 4.2: Agents’ individual reaction to contract 1 and contract 2 
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 [N = 42 observations] 
 
 
Looking at the differences between contract 1 and contract 3, 
the majority of agents favors contract 3 (59.5%). 38.1% give the 
same contribution in both contracts and only 2.4% of the agents 
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favor contract 1. The fraction of agents favoring contract 3 is 
significantly higher than those favoring contract 1 (Binomial-Test, 
two-tailed, p=0.021). 
 
Figure 4.3: Agents’ individual reaction to contract 1 and contract 3 
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 [N = 42 observations] 
 
 
Result 4.4: 
The coordination dilemma is highest in contract 2 and lowest in 
contract 3. Giving a supporting coordination device to the agents in 
terms of setting a minimum requested contribution helps the agents 
to increase their cooperation. 
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4.5 The Impact of Communication 
 
 
4.5.1 The Behavioral Impact of Communication 
 
In this section we analyze the impact of communication on 
agents’ behavior in our experiment. We implement a chat-software 
which allows the agents to communicate about their contribution. 
The principal is not able to take part in the chat. There is no 
limitation of time, hence agents can use the chat as long as they 
want. However, the chat is “cheap talk”, i.e. the agents are not 
bounded to the announcements in the chat. In order to ensure that 
agents do not try to identify each other and to threaten to do anything 
if someone is shirking, the chat is observed during the whole 
experiment. Once an agent has made his contribution decisions for 
all contracts, he is excluded from the chat. 
As the chat sessions do not differ from the sessions without chat 
with regard to the profit and cost functions we do not expect any 
behavioral differences between the treatments. If there is an 
incentive to deviate from any announcements higher than the Nash 
contribution, due to the cheap talk communication should not have 
any behavioral impact (Farell 1987, 1993, Rabin 1990). However, 
lots of studies show that cooperation is positively and robustly 
affected by the social distance between the participants which in turn 
can be influenced by communication (Bohnet/Frey 1999, Hoffmann 
et al. 1996, Sally 1995). Hence, the coordination dilemma in public 
goods can be reduced even by a non-binding communication 
(Farell/Gibbons 1989, Farell/Rabin 1996, Isaac/Walker 1988). 
 
 
  
 
105
Presumption 4.5: 
Communication reduces the social distance within teams. We expect 
to observe higher average contribution rates in each kind of 
contract. 
 
Furthermore, the question arises if communication changes the 
agents’ perception of the different ranges of contribution in the three 
contracts. While chatting about the optimal contribution rate, agents 
might point out the different meanings of the three contracts and 
create a more sophisticated understanding of the intention of each 
contract. Nevertheless, as agents just meet once during the 
experiment and as there is still no chance to commit each other to 
any contribution the coordination dilemma should be still the same, 
too. 
 
Presumption 4.6: 
We expect no change in the rank of the average contribution rates 
between the three contracts compared to the treatment without chat. 
Average contribution should still be highest in contract 2 and lowest 
in contract 3. 
 
 
4.5.2 Experimental Evidence with Communication 
 
Our data give support to the positive impact of communication 
on agents’ contribution. As shown in figure 4.4, the average 
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contribution is higher in the treatment with chat25 as in the treatment 
without chat. 
 
Figure 4.4: Average contribution per treatment and contract 
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    [N = 294 observations with chat and 147 observations without chat] 
 
 
For each kind of contract, the differences between the treatment 
with and without chat are highly statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney U-Test, two-tailed, p<0.001). But even though the agents’ 
contribution increases with the opportunity to communicate, it still 
does not reach the team optimum. The chat logs show that agents try 
to agree on the team optimum, but cannot accomplish it. In about 
57% of the chat logs, we observe a clear free-riding behavioral 
pattern in the corresponding actual contributions. People provide 
obviously lower contributions as they announce in the chat. 
Furthermore, in some cases agents try to influence or even to bluff 
each other. In 35% of the chats, agents give approximately what they 
                                                 
25 Due to a software problem, we only use the data of the first session with chat 
for our analysis.  
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signalize. Most often, they give relatively high contributions. In 8% 
of the chats, we are not able to interpret the chat logs, because agents 
do not use the chat to discuss about their contributions. In the 
following we report a typical chat protocol26 with the corresponding 
contributions: 
 
“Agent 1: 60 is the optimum in every case. 
Agent 2: I think 56 is the optimum (…) for 56 I get 66,64 and for 60 I get 66,5. 
(…) it should be 56, shouldn’t it? 
Agent 1: And then you come along again and give less / 
Agent 3: How often did you experience that? (…) In my team it always worked. 
Agent 1: Ok, 56!!!!” 
 
Table 4.3 lists the actual contributions accompanying this chat log: 
 
Table 4.3: Actually given contributions of team 6, period 4, session 1 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 
contract 1 [0;80] 15 24 40 
contract 2 [0;60] 15 24 40 
contract 3 [20;80] 25 24 40 
 
 
Result 4.5: 
Communication increases the average contribution in each kind of 
contract. 
 
Despite of the communication there is no change in the rank 
between the three contracts, so average contribution is still highest 
for the lower bounded contract and still lowest for the upper bounded 
contract (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<0.001). Figure 4.5 shows that 
                                                 
26 Original conversation in the chat protocol was in German, translation by the 
authors. 
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the averages in contract 3 are clearly higher than the averages in 
contract 1 and contract 2 in all periods. But the relation changes if 
we compare the averages per period between contract 1 and contract 
2. The average contribution of contract 1 starts being higher in the 
beginning of the experiment and falls below the average contribution 
of contract 2 in the last period. Hence, it might be that the principal’s 
decision to set the upper limit appears in a different light if agents 
have the opportunity to chat about it. However, the difference in 
period 7 is statistically not significant. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Average contribution per period with chat 
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               [N = 21 observations per period] 
 
 
Result 4.6: 
We observe no change in the rank of the three contracts due to 
communication. Average contribution is still highest in contract 3 
and lowest in contract 2. 
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Again, we also look at agents’ individual favoritism between 
the three contracts. According to section 4.3, we check in which 
contract each agent’s average contribution is highest, disregarding 
the absolute level of the given contribution. Figure 4.6 shows the 
individual reactions between contract 1 and 2. Compared to figure 
4.2 there is hardly a difference between the distributions with chat 
and without chat (Fisher exact test). Again the majority of agents are 
indifferent between the two contracts. However, the part of agents 
who favors contract 1 is significantly higher than the part of agents 
who favors contract 2 (Binomial-test, two-tailed, p=0.039). 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Agents’ individual reaction to 
contract 1 and contract 2 with chat 
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  [N = 21 observations] 
 
 
According to this, figure 4.7 shows the individual reactions 
between contract 1 and 3. Compared to figure 4.3 the relation 
changes, because now the majority of agents is indifferent between 
contract 1 and 3. No agent favors contract 1 and 42.9% favor the 
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third contract. Obviously, the part of agents favoring contract 3 is 
significantly higher than those favoring contract 1 (Binomial-test, 
one-tailed, p=0.063). 
 
Figure 4.7: Agents’ individual reaction to 
contract 1 and contract 3 with chat 
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 [N = 21 observations] 
 
 
Result 4.7: 
Even with communication giving a supporting coordination device in 
terms of setting a requested minimum amount to the agents seems to 
increase the average contributions. The coordination dilemma is 
significantly lower in contract 3 than in contract 1 or 2. 
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4.6 The Impact of Good and Bad 
Experiences 
 
 
Beside the different ranges of contribution and the 
implementation of the chat, agents’ behavior might also be 
determined by the fact that agents repeatedly play the game for seven 
periods. Even though due to the matching algorithm the participants 
do not meet more than once during the experiment there might be 
some learning behavior. As shown in figures 4.1 and 4.5, in both 
treatments we observe a declining trend over the seven periods which 
seems to be even stronger when agents can use the chat. This could 
be explained by the learning hypothesis. The learning hypothesis 
means that participants may not immediately understand the 
incentive of the game to free-ride, but they will learn it after some 
periods of repetition (Andreoni 1988b). In the beginning there might 
be more agents who try to agree on a cooperation rate because they 
understand that this would be beneficial for the whole team. But 
when they recognize that they fail reaching the team optimum and 
feel being ripped off by their colleagues, they might try to obtain 
higher payoffs by giving less in the following period themselves. 
This means they learn to free-ride due to the bad experiences they 
have made. According to Fischbacher et al. (2001), these people can 
be called the “conditional cooperators”, i.e. people who would be 
willing to provide more if others provide more, too. Fischbacher et 
al. show that only about a third of the subjects are real free-riders 
giving nothing at all. But about 50% are conditional cooperators 
whose behavior is strongly influenced by their beliefs about the other 
people’s contribution. Hence, we presume the following about 
agents’ behavior: 
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Presumption 4.7: 
Bad experiences in the past reduce agents’ willingness to contribute 
in the future. 
 
We call an agent having made bad experiences if his 
contribution in the past exceeds the average contribution of his team 
members.27 We concentrate on the average of the two other agents 
because each agent just gets to know the collective team output and 
does not get to know the individual contributions of his partners.  
To measure the influence of the bad experience we use the ratio 
between the collective team contribution and each agent’s individual 
contribution per group and per period. If all agents provide the same 
amount, the ratio reaches a value of 3. If an agent has given more 
than the others, the ratio would be smaller than 3. If he has given 
less, the ratio exceeds the value of 3. Hence, we define a dummy-
variable “bad experience” that takes the value of 1 if the ratio is 
smaller than 3.28 In order to control not only for the influence of the 
last period but also for previous experiences, we further calculate a 
moving average of the last three periods. Table 4.4 shows the results 
of an OLS-regression: 
 
                                                 
27 Hence, free-riders most often make good experiences, because they provide 
less than their team partners. 
 
28 If an agent has given a contribution of 0, the ratio cannot be calculated. In this 
case, the dummy “bad experience” is set manually to 0. 
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Table 4.4: Dependent variable: Agents’ contribution in contract 1, 2, 3 
 contribution 1 contribution 2 contribution 3 
bad 
experience 
          20.60*** 
          (2.80) 
          20.20*** 
          (2.61) 
          14.94*** 
          (2.40) 
treatment            5.73* 
          (3.15) 
           7.73** 
          (3.20) 
           5.75** 
          (2.52) 
period yes yes yes 
const           38.84*** 
          (2.85) 
          33.20*** 
          (2.44) 
          41.62*** 
          (2.48) 
R-squared 0.26 0.29 0.22 
observations 441 441 441 
[Note: Robust standard errors clustered for subjects (63 clusters) are in    
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level denoted  
*** (**, *).] 
 
 
The experience has a striking influence in all contracts. But in 
opposite to what we have presumed, having made bad experiences in 
the past does not reduce agents’ contributions, it even raises 
substantially their willingness to contribute. We try to find a reason 
for this effect by arguing conversely. Most often, those agents who 
have reached a high payoff and in line with our definition therefore 
have made good experiences in the past are free-riders. If the 
strategy to free-ride has been successful, there is no incentive to 
change the future strategy.29 Thus, once an agent has got a high 
payoff due to free-riding, he is going to free-ride again. As the 
majority of agents are free-riders in our experiment, it might be that 
this effect dominates the potential negative reaction of disappointed 
agents who have made bad experiences in the past.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Remember that the final payoff is determined by one randomly chosen period 
in the end of the experiment, i.e. players have an incentive to perform best in 
each period instead of smoothing their payoffs over all periods. 
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Result 4.8: 
Good experiences in the past in sense of having reached a high 
payoff by providing a low contribution reduce agents’ contribution 
in the future, too. In turn, having made bad experiences in the past 
seems to increase the agents’ willingness to provide a high 
contribution. 
 
 
 
4.7 Discussion 
 
In this study we analyze the impact of different types of 
coordination devices on agents’ behavior in a team situation. We 
wanted to investigate if a coordination device given in terms of a 
limited autonomy could be an issue to reduce free-riding in teams. 
We conducted a simple experimental game with groups of four 
participants. One principal had to choose one out of three different 
types of contract to offer to his three agents. The three contracts 
differing in their limitations were chosen according to the given 
profit-, cost- and production functions. There are three thresholds we 
expected to be important in our experimental environment: the Nash 
predicted contribution ( 18.75ie = ), the team best contribution 
( 56.25ie = ) and the first best contribution ( 75ie = ). If agents were 
selfish and just focused on their own profit, they should choose the 
contribution in the Nash equilibrium. By choosing the team best 
contribution the agents maximize the team’s collective payoff 
excluding the principal while by choosing the first best contribution 
they include the principal’s payoff in their calculus. So the principal 
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can decide either not to restrict the agents’ choices at all (contract 
with range from 0 to 80) or to protect the agents from giving more 
than the team best contribution (range from 0 to 60) or to force the 
agents to give a requested minimum amount (range from 20 to 80). 
The following observations are the most important among our 
findings: As expected, agents’ reaction varies with regard to the 
different ranges of contributions. The average contribution is highest 
if agents are bounded below and lowest if they are bounded above. 
Agents apparently appreciate the supporting coordination device 
given by the principal by setting a requested minimum amount 
because it reduces the danger being totally exploited by the other 
team members. Thus, agents are willing to give higher contributions 
themselves in order to reach a higher cooperation rate which is 
favorable for all participants. Furthermore, the requested minimum 
amount seems not to be seen as a signal of distrust or selfishness by 
the principal which might reduce agents’ motivation. 
To check whether the opportunity to communicate between the 
agents might have any influence on agents’ perception of the 
principal’s contract decision, we implement a chat-software in a 
further treatment. Now the agents are allowed to communicate about 
their contribution rate but they are still not able to commit each other 
to what they have announced. We show that even a non-binding 
communication in a one-shot game can help to reduce the social 
distance between the team members and therefore to increase the 
average given contribution rate. However, we observe no change in 
the impact of the different ranges of contribution on agents’ 
behavior. 
Concluding, our results indicate that agents appreciate getting 
support to solve their coordination dilemma. Giving a coordination 
device by setting a requested minimum standard is seen as a helpful 
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support that encourages the agents to provide higher contributions 
and that reduces the incentive to free-ride. To go further into that 
question and in order to see if agents deliberately would commit 
themselves to a certain contribution to reach a higher cooperation 
rate maybe one could let the agents endogenously decide between 
different degrees of autonomy in sense of different ranges of 
contribution in further treatments. 
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4.8 Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Experimental Instructions (Originals were in German) 
 
Periods and Roles 
• The experiment consists of seven periods. 
• There are players A and players B. Roles are randomly chosen 
in the beginning and do not change during the experiment. 
• In each period, one player A is randomly assigned to three 
players B. The other participants’ identity will be unknown. 
Groups are changing in each period, but you will never meet 
twice another participant. 
 
Player A’s decision 
• Player A has to offer a contract to the players B. He can 
decide between three different types of contract: 
1. Each player B has to choose an effort out of the range [0; 
80]. 
2. Each player B has to choose an effort out of the range [0; 
60]. 
3. Each player B has to choose an effort out of the range [20; 
80]. 
• Effort is costly to the players B (see cost table). The higher 
the effort, the higher are the costs. 
 
Player B’s decision 
• Simultaneously to player A’s decision, the players B choose 
an effort for each of the three types of contract.  
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• So each player B gives three possible efforts within the 
particular limitations of each contract before he gets to know 
which type of contract player A actually decided on. 
 
[Only for the treatment with chat: 
• The players B have the opportunity to discuss with the other 
players B of their group via a controlled chat software about 
the effort decisions for the different contract types. It is not 
allowed to identify each other. 
• Once a player B has made his effort decisions, he can no 
longer participate in the chat in this period, but he can observe 
the communication between the two remaining players B.] 
 
Publication of decisions 
• After each player B has given an individual effort for each of 
the three contracts, player A’s decision will be announced. 
• Each player will learn the sum of the efforts the whole group 
has given for the chosen type of contract. They will not learn 
the collective efforts of the two other contracts. 
• No one (neither player A nor player B) will learn the 
individual efforts of each player B, so no one knows which 
effort has been chosen by which player B. 
 
Realization of the earnings 
• The collective output of all players B per group is the sum of 
the three efforts for one contract multiplied by 1,5. 
3
1
1,5* i
i
collective output Y effort
=
= = ∑  
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• This collective output will be split between player A and the 
players B as follows: 
o Player A’s profit is 25% of the collective output: 
0, 25*profit player A Y=  
o Player B’s profit is 25% of the collective output as well 
but minus his individual costs: 
0, 25*profit player B Y costs of input= −  
 
Endowment and payoffs 
• In the beginning of each period each player B gets an 
endowment in the experimental currency “taler” of 35 talers. 
• The players A get an endowment of 20 talers. 
• In the end of the experiment one of the seven periods is 
randomly chosen and paid off with an exchange rate of 0,23 € 
per taler. 
 
 
Please note: 
• No communication at all will be allowed – expect via the 
experimental software. 
• For each played period there will be one record card, so you 
may have a look at the results of the previous periods 
• The payoff will be anonymously. No one will get to know the 
other participants earnings. 
• These instructions will be collected when the experiment is 
finished. 
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Cost Table and Chart: 
     
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79
Effort
C
os
ts
 
 
 
Effort Costs Effort Costs Effort Costs Effort Costs 
 
0 
 
0 
 
20 
 
4 
 
40 
 
16 
 
60 
 
36 
1 0.01 21 4.41 41 16.81 61 37.21 
2 0.04 22 4.84 42 17.64 62 38.44 
3 0.09 23 5.29 43 18.49 63 39.69 
4 0.16 24 5.76 44 19.36 64 40.96 
5 0.25 25 6.25 45 20.25 65 42.25 
6 0.36 26 6.76 46 21.16 66 43.56 
7 0.49 27 7.29 47 22.09 67 44.89 
8 0.64 28 7.84 48 23.04 68 46.24 
9 0.81 29 8.41 49 24.01 69 47.61 
10 1 30 9 50 25 70 49 
11 1.21 31 9.61 51 26.01 71 50.41 
12 1.44 32 10.24 52 27.04 72 51.84 
13 1.69 33 10.89 53 28.09 73 53.29 
14 1.96 34 11.56 54 29.16 74 54.76 
15 2.25 35 12.25 55 30.25 75 56.25 
16 2.56 36 12.96 56 31.36 76 57.76 
17 2.89 37 13.69 57 32.49 77 59.29 
18 3.24 38 14.44 58 33.64 78 60.84 
19 3.61 39 15.21 59 34.81 79 62.41 
      80 64 
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Chapter 5 
On the Interaction of Reciprocity 
and Inequity Aversion in a Real 
Effort Experiment 30 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
While chapters 2, 3 and 4 mainly deal with impact of 
reciprocity, in this chapter we also incorporate the impact of fairness 
respectively inequity aversion in our study. 
The role of fairness in social interactions has already been 
elucidated from sociologists and social psychologists in the mid of 
the twentieth century (e.g. Heider 1958, Homans 1958, Adams 1965, 
Walster et al. 1973). Economists, too, started to incorporate fairness 
                                                 
30 This chapter is based on Gerlach (2007c). 
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considerations in their work only few years later (Selten 1978, Güth 
1994). The comparison of wages between workers and the 
consequences of inequity have been subject to many labor market 
studies in recent years. Hence, workers’ reaction to unequally 
distributed wages is most often explained by the influence of social 
preferences like altruism, reciprocity or inequity aversion (e.g. 
Kahneman et al. 1986, Fehr et al. 1993, Fehr/Gächter 1998, 2000a, 
Gächter/Fehr 2002, Fehr/Schmidt 2003, Charness 2004). 
An important question is whether and under which 
circumstances people perceive an action as unfair or unkind. Equal 
payment even for workers on the same hierarchy need not 
automatically be fair (e.g. Holmström 1982, Erev et al. 1993, Abeler 
et al. 2006). On the other hand, even though efficiency wage theory 
is based on the concept of wage comparisons (Akerlof/Yellen 1990), 
it is a challenge to adjust unequal payment accordingly to different 
performance standards without unnecessarily discriminating some 
workers (Clark et al. 2006, Torgler et al. 2006). Thus, it is the ratio 
between input and outcomes that determines perceived equity 
(Adams 1963). 
But beside the distribution of input and outcomes, perceived 
equity also depends on the underlying intention of an action which 
refers to a person’s reciprocal preferences. As already discussed 
comprehensively in the preceding chapters, people who reciprocate 
are those who react kindly when they are treated kindly themselves 
respectively those who punish an unkind action. Instead, inequity 
aversion refers to the consequences of inequity. Inequity averse 
people dishonor unequal distributed returns. 
While the influences of distribution and intention based 
concerns on agents’ behavior are difficult to distinguish from each 
other empirically, many theoretical approaches just concentrate on 
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one of the two aspects, distribution or intention. For example, Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that 
actions are only consequentialistically and not intentionally driven. 
Hence, players reward kind actions or punish unkind actions only to 
enhance equity and not to sanction unfair behavior. 
On the other side, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) assume that players only reciprocate to reward or 
punish the intention of an action while the distribution of the 
outcomes is not seen as a determining factor. Hence, interpersonal 
comparisons between two outcomes as a driver of players’ behavior 
are neglected. An approach to combine both aspects is given by Falk 
and Fischbacher (2006) who take into account that the perceived 
kindness of an action depends on both, the consequences as well as 
the intention of an action. They assume that reciprocal behavior is 
mainly driven as an answer to kindness. But if an action is perceived 
as kind or unkind depends on the consequences as well as on the 
actor’s underlying intention. Hence, this theory can also explain why 
the same consequences of an action can trigger different reactions. 
 
The contribution of this chapter is to investigate experimentally 
the interdependencies between the consequences and the employer’s 
intention of unequally paid wages. We try to separate the influences 
of equity and reciprocity on agents’ motivation to exert effort in a 
lab experiment. Charness (2004) analyzes a similar question. He 
shows that players’ behavior is mainly attributed by both, 
distribution and intention based concerns. However, in the Charness 
experiment the employee has to make an abstract effort decision. In 
contrast, we use a real effort task to simulate more realistically a 
labor market. Agents have to count the number of “7” in a block of 
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random numbers. Thus, this task is quite independent of individual 
abilities.  
We conduct a simple experimental game with groups consisting 
of one principal and two agents. The agents receive a fixed wage 
which is independent of the effort they exert, but by solving their 
real effort task they can increase the principal’s payoff. In the first 
treatment, both agents get the same fixed wage. In the second 
treatment, agents are unequally paid. The (randomly chosen) lower 
paid agent gets 25% less than the higher paid agent. The important 
point is that the principal has no power of decision at all in this 
treatment, because the unequal payment is given exogenously by the 
experimenters.31 This point changes in the third treatment where the 
principal can decide whether he wants to pay his agents equally or 
unequally keeping the saved residual fixed wage for his own. Note 
that the principal can just decide whether to give the same high fixed 
wage to both agents or to give a 25% lower wage to one (again 
randomly chosen) agent of his group, but he cannot give the same 
low fixed wage to both agents.  
Thus, by analyzing the second treatment where agents are 
exogenously unequally paid, we can disregard the influence of 
reciprocity with regard to the principal. If there is any impact of 
agents’ behavior due to the unequal payment, the difference in effort 
should be influenced by equity concerns. In contrast, any behavioral 
reaction in the third treatment where the unequal payment is 
endogenously chosen by the principal could be due to either equity 
concerns or reciprocity. Hence, differences in agents’ behavior 
between the second and third treatment might be attributed to 
reciprocal influences. 
                                                 
31 The assumption of exogenously given unequal wages might be compared with 
given legal or union-based regulations in a real work environment. 
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Our results show that neither pure equity concerns nor pure 
intention based reciprocity can explain how agents response to 
unequal payment. Agents’ behavior seems to be strongly affected by 
both aspects. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 
5.2 we describe our experimental design and procedure. We derive 
our behavioral predictions in section 5.3 and show our experimental 
results in section 5.4. The paper concludes in section 5.5. 
 
 
 
5.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted in October 2006 at the Cologne 
Laboratory of Experimental Economics at the University of Cologne, 
Germany. We conducted three different treatments with 60 
participants per treatment. None of the participants took part in more 
than one session. We used the online recruiting-system ORSEE 
(Greiner 2004) to recruit students from all faculties of the University 
of Cologne. The experiment was programmed with the software z-
tree (Fischbacher 1999). Each session lasted about 45 minutes and 
students left the laboratory with an average earning of 10.50 €. 
In the beginning of the experiment, the participants draw a 
number between 1 and 30 that indicated their place in the laboratory. 
Before the experiment started the instructions were distributed and 
read out and questions were answered. As we used a real effort task, 
we wanted to get sure that possible differences in agents’ effort 
exertion could not be derived from different talents. Therefore, we 
adopt the task used in Mohnen et al. (2007). Students had to count 
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the number of “7” in a block of random numbers. We limited the 
maximum number of possible counted blocks to 25 in not more than 
five minutes in order to motivate agents to edit the task faithfully. 
For each accurately answered block we credited eight cent to the 
students’ account, for each incorrectly answered block they got 
nothing. To avoid any strategically considerations, the players got no 
feedback about their performance. Furthermore, in the beginning of 
the experiment we conducted one period where agents had to solve 
the task for their own benefit. This period was not part of the main 
experiment; it was just implemented to be able to compare the 
employees’ effort when they are working for their own benefit or for 
the employer’s benefit. Henceforth, we call this period the “ability 
checker”. 
 After having played the ability checker, the participants were 
assigned to the role of a principal or an agent and the main 
experiment started. We used the descriptions “employer” and 
“employee”32 to make participants more sensitive to the labor market 
context. One employer and two employees were assigned to a group 
of three. During the whole main experiment which consisted of four 
periods of five minutes they stayed in the same group constellation 
and did not change their role. However, players stayed anonymously, 
hence no one knew with whom he was playing in a group. Before 
each period started, the fixed wage was credited to the employees’ 
account and each employee got to know his own as well as the other 
employee’s wage. After this, they had to work on exactly the same 
task as it was given in the ability checker, but now for each 
accurately answered block we credited eight cent to the employer’s 
account and not to the employees’ accounts. Thus, the employees’ 
                                                 
32 As the original instructions are in German, we used the words “Arbeitnehmer” 
and “Arbeitgeber”. 
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payoff in the main experiment was completely independent of the 
performance, by solving the real effort task they could just increase 
the employer’s payoff. After five minutes the period was finished. 
Again, the players got no feedback about their performance. They 
just received their fixed wage for the next period and the next period 
started. Note that the fixed wage did not change during the whole 
experiment but varied between the three treatments, as it will be 
shown below. After the fourth period the main experiment was 
finished. Again we conducted an ability checker for each player 
(employer and employee). As in the ability checker in the first 
period, for each accurately answered block we credited 8 cent to each 
player’s own account. Afterwards, the participants were asked to 
answer some questions concerning their motivation to act and the 
experiment was finished. Each employee’s payoff was composed of 
the result of the accurately answered blocks in the two ability 
checkers in round 1 and 6 and the fixed wage from round 2 to 5. The 
employers as well got the result from their accurately answered 
blocks in round 1 and 6 and the result of the correctly answered 
blocks of their two employees in round 2 to 5. In addition, each 
player (employer and employee) got a show-up fee of 2.50 €. 
The experimental procedure was the same in all treatments. 
Hence, the difference between the treatments is given by different 
fixed wages the employer has to offer to his employees. In the first 
treatment, the employer starts with an endowment of 16 € that he has 
to give completely to the employees: 2 € in each of the four periods 
per employee. Thus, it is common knowledge to all participants that 
the employer has no power of decision at all and that his payoff 
solely depends on the employees’ work. 
In the second treatment, the employer still has nothing to 
decide, but he starts with an endowment of 14 € instead of 16 €. This 
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time he has to give unequal wages to his employees, namely a fixed 
wage of 2 € per period to one employee and a fixed wage of 1.50 € to 
the other employee. The lower paid employee is randomly chosen in 
the beginning of the second period and does not change during the 
four periods of the main experiment. 
While in the first and second treatment the equal respectively 
unequal payment is exogenously given, in the third treatment the 
employer gets an active part and can decide whether he wants to pay 
equal or unequal wages to his employees. This decision, however, 
has to be made just once in the beginning of the experiment and 
remains constant over all periods. The employer starts with an 
endowment of 16 €. Either he can give 2 € per period to both of his 
employees or he gives 2 € to one employee and 1.50 € to the other 
(again randomly picked) employee. But he is not allowed to give the 
lower wage of 1.50 € to both employees. Hence, by choosing the 
unequal payment, the principal keeps the remaining 2 € from his 
endowment. 
In the following, we call the first treatment where all agents are 
equally paid T(Equal), the second treatment where agents are 
exogenously unequally paid T(Exogenous) and the third treatment 
where the principal can decide whether to pay equally or unequally 
T(Endogenous). 
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5.3 Behavioral Predictions and Hypotheses 
 
According to standard economic theory, agents are supposed to 
be selfish and try to maximize their own payoff. As exerting the real 
effort task in our experiment is boring and therefore costly to the 
agents and as agents’ payoff is independent of their performance in 
the main experiment, a selfish agent would refrain from counting the 
“7”. Hence, agents would get their fixed wage and the principal 
would get nothing at all. However, there is substantial evidence 
suggesting that fairness motives affect the behavior of many people. 
Concretely, we expect to observe a kind of altruism in T(Equal). 
Because the principal has no impact on the fixed wage the agents 
receive, we call those agents who work despite of the independency 
between their work and their payoff to behave altruistically. 
 
Presumption 5.1: 
Even though the employees receive a fixed wage in all treatments, 
there is a substantial amount of altruistic agents who deliberately 
solve the real effort task for the employer’s benefit. 
 
Now we focus on agents’ reaction to the different payment 
schemes. In T(Equal), both agents receive equal wages, hence there 
should be no difference in agents’ effort exertion for equity 
concerns33. This changes in T(Exogenous), where agents are 
exogenously unequally paid. As it is not the principal who decides 
about the imparity, there should be no reciprocal motives to reward 
or punish the principal’s decision. Hence, if there are any differences 
                                                 
33 We control for differences in the number of correctly counted blocks that are 
due to differences in agents’ ability by comparing the ability checkers. 
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in the effort compared to the equal payment treatment, this could 
only be for equity reasons. According to the equity theory (Adams 
1963, 1965), equity is said to occur when people perceive that the 
ratio between their outcome and input is equal to the ratio between 
outcome and input of the comparison person(s). Hence, regardless of 
the absolute levels equity depends on the relation between input and 
output. As in T(Exogenous) one agent per group gets a fixed wage 
which is 25% below the other agent’s fixed wage, we suppose the 
lower paid agent to feel envy and therefore to spend less effort in 
order to adjust his ratio. On the other side, we expect no reaction of 
the higher paid agent. Of course, he should perceive the inequity 
between the outputs of both agents, too. Bus as this inequity is in 
favor to him, it might moreover lead to satisfaction instead of 
dissatisfaction (Pritchard 1969: 209). The idea that people suffer 
more from inequity that is to their disadvantage is a well known 
issue (e.g. Loewenstein et al. 1989) and finds also support in the 
literature concerning the impact of loss aversion (e.g. 
Tversky/Kahneman 1991). We suppose the higher paid agent not to 
feel responsible for the wage differential and just to have a feeling of 
having good luck. Hence, we derive our second presumption: 
 
Presumption 5.2: 
We suppose the lower paid employee to exert a lower effort in 
T(Exogenous) as in T(Equal) and compared to the higher paid 
employee. We do not expect to observe any differences in the higher 
paid employee’s effort. 
 
In T(Endogenous), the principal can decide if he wants to pay 
his agents equally or unequally. If the principal prefers the unequal 
payment keeping the residual fixed wage for his own, this decision 
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could be perceived unkindly from the agents’ point of view because 
the principal voluntarily discriminates one agent for his own benefit. 
Hence, in addition to the impact of equity concerns (as predicted 
above in presumption 5.2), agents might also react reciprocally. 
Beside of the feeling of envy, the lower paid agent now might also 
have the need to sanction the principal by exerting less effort. Again, 
we suppose the higher paid agent to have no feeling of guilt and 
furthermore to have no need to sanction the principal’s unkind 
decision because the discrimination leads to his satisfaction. But as 
the principal’s decision to offer unequal wages is directed towards 
both agents, and as the one who earns less is picked randomly, even 
the higher paid agent might react reciprocally by punishing the 
principal’s unkindness. 
 
Presumption 5.3: 
In T(Endogenous), we expect to observe a further loss in the lower 
paid employee’s effort compared to T(Exogenous). Furthermore, we 
expect to observe a loss in the higher paid employee’s effort 
compared to T(Equal) and T(Exogenous). 
 
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
In this section we present our experimental results and discuss 
possible explanations for the observed behavior. We use the number 
of the correctly counted blocks as an indicator for each agent’s 
effort. First of all, we show some descriptive details in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Mean of correctly counted blocks 
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[N = 20 independent observations per agent and per treatment] 
 
 
The black and dark-gray bars show the average correctly 
counted blocks (excluding the principals’ performance) in the ability 
checkers in the first and sixth period separated for the two types of 
employees. Not surprisingly, in all treatments averages are 
significantly higher in the ability checkers where agents work for 
their own payoff than in the periods of the main experiment 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p<0.001). But even in the 
main experiment, agents deliberately work on their real effort task 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p<0.001). In T(Equal), there 
is only one agent who exerts effort in the ability checkers but not in 
periods two to five. In T(Exogenous), again only one of the agents 
refuses to work.34 In T(Endogenous), there are three agents exerting 
no effort at all in the main periods but in the ability checkers. Hence, 
                                                 
34 But this agent does not work at all in the ability checkers, too. 
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we can confirm presumption 5.1, that most of the agents altruistically 
exert effort even if it is only for the principal’s benefit and not for 
their own one. 
 
Result 5.1: 
Most of the employees behave altruistically. They deliberately exert 
effort that is only advantage to the employer. 
  
In T(Equal), there is no significant difference in efforts between 
the two agents (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).35 This observation 
corresponds to our expectations, because agents are equally paid and 
hence there should be no motivational differences for fairness 
purposes. According to presumption 5.2, we expected to observe a 
loss in the lower paid agent’s effort due to a feeling of envy towards 
the higher paid agent in T(Exogenous). Interestingly, the data report 
other behavior. Compared to T(Equal), there is no significant 
difference in agents’ effort exertion, neither for the higher nor for the 
lower paid agent (Mann-Whitney U-Test). Furthermore, efforts 
between the higher and lower paid agent in T(Exogenous) do not 
differ significantly, too.36 This result contradicts our prediction. It 
seems that the exogenously given unequal payment does not 
influence agents’ behavior. As mentioned in the previous section, a 
disadvantaged agent should try to eliminate or reduce the imparity in 
his ratio between input and outcome compared to the other agent. An 
issue to reach this objective is to adjust one’s own inputs or 
outcomes. In the present situation, an agent has no chance to change 
                                                 
35 However, the ability checkers between agent 1 and agent 2 differ slightly 
significantly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p=0.05). 
 
36 We also observe no differences in the ability checkers between T(Equal) and 
T(Exogenous) (Mann-Whitney U-Test) or between the agents in T(Exogenous) 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
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his output in the main experiment because he gets the same fixed 
wage in each period. Hence, an obvious reaction would be to adjust 
his input which means to exert less costly effort (presumption 5.2). 
Apparently, this mechanism does not work in this treatment.  
But according to Adams, there are several other ways to reduce 
the inequity. One possible explanation might be that the 
disadvantaged person cognitively distorts his or the other’s input or 
outcome. This means that the inequity appears in another light. In the 
context of T(Exogenous) it might be that the lower paid agent does 
not perceive the imparity between the outcomes as a relevant 
difference. As the wages are given exogenously, it is only a question 
of luck to get the higher or the lower wage. Thus, the lower paid 
agent does not feel any individual disadvantage and therefore the 
inequity might trigger no change in the agent’s behavioral reaction. 
 
Result 5.2: 
Unequal wages without any human intervention do not involve a 
reaction of the disadvantaged employee. Hence, exogenously given 
inequity is no relevant factor to determine the employees’ effort. 
 
Next, we analyze agents’ reaction in T(Endogenous), where the 
principal can decide whether he wants to pay his agents equally or 
unequally. As predicted in presumption 5.3, we expect that the loss 
in the lower paid agent’s effort should be higher than in 
T(Exogenous) because in addition to the inequity aversion, agents 
also might reciprocate to the principal’s decision. This time, the data 
give support to our prediction.37 Compared to T(Exogenous) as well 
as to T(Equal), the lower paid agent exerts significantly less effort 
                                                 
37 Fortunately, most of the principals chose the unequal payment. Only 20% of 
the principals decided to offer equal wages. 
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(Mann-Whitney U-Test, p<0.01 in both cases). Furthermore, there is 
a highly significant difference between the higher and lower paid 
agent in T(Endogenous) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, 
p<0.01) even though there is no difference in the ability (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test). Thus, despite of the identical consequences of the 
unequal wages in both treatments, in T(Endogenous) inequity matters 
much more due to the underlying intention of the principal. By 
deciding to pay the agents unequally and to keep the residual fixed 
wage for his own, the principal signals his selfish intention which is 
punished by the disadvantaged agent. On the other side, comparing 
the lower paid agents’ reaction in T(Endogenous) to T(Equal), we 
observe no significant difference (Mann-Whitney U-Test), so that we 
might conclude, that the consequences alone cannot explain the 
behavioral pattern we observe.  
Furthermore, differences in the higher paid agent’s effort 
exertion are statistically not significant between all treatments 
(Mann-Whitney U-Test). However, the higher paid agents’ effort in 
T(Endogenous) is about 20% lower than in the two other treatments. 
Even though this difference is statistically not significant (p=0.15), it 
seems that because the selfish intention to offer unequal wages to the 
agents is directed to both agents and not exclusively to one special 
agent, the unequal payment also influences the higher paid agent.  
 
Result 5.3: 
Neither pure consequences nor pure underlying intention of unequal 
paid wages determines the employees’ reaction. It is moreover a 
combination of both that triggers a person’s perception of inequity 
and thereby his behavioral reaction. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This study tries to contribute to the investigation of the 
ambiguous interdependencies between reciprocity and inequity 
aversion when workers are paid unequally in organizations. We use 
the advantage of a laboratory experiment to control for the different 
influences. We conducted a simple experimental game with a real 
effort task and with groups consisting of one employer and two 
employees. Different treatments were designed in order to separate 
the influences of inequity aversion and reciprocity from each other. 
In the first T(Equal) and second treatment T(Exogenous), the 
employer has no power of decision at all because the payment 
schemes are given exogenously by the experimenters. In T(Equal) all 
employees are equally and in T(Exogenous) they are all unequally 
paid. By this, we are able to eliminate any reciprocal influences. In 
contrast to this, in the third treatment T(Endogenous), the employer 
has to choose whether he wants to pay his employees equally or 
unequally. Choosing the latter, he can save the residual fixed wage 
for his own profit, hence the unequal payment is an unkind and 
selfish action discriminating one of the two employees that might 
provoke the employees to reciprocate by punishing the employer’s 
unfriendly decision. 
We expected to observe a loss in the lower paid agents’ effort in 
T(Exogenous) due to inequity aversion. Furthermore, we expected 
this loss to be even greater in T(Endogenous) because in addition to 
the distribution concerned reaction, agents might also sanction the 
unkind intention of the unequal payment. 
Interestingly, these predictions cannot completely be confirmed 
by the data. In T(Exogenous), we observe no influence at all of the 
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given inequity. It seems that agents do not feel discriminated due to 
the externally given imparity and therefore do not have the need to 
change their ratio between input and outcome (Adams 1963). 
However, in T(Endogenous), we find support for the assumption of 
the negative impact of unequal wages on agents’ motivation. The 
lower paid employee exerts significantly less effort compared to the 
higher paid employee as well as compared to T(Exogenous) and to 
the equally paid employees in T(Equal). Apparently, the imparity 
appears in a completely different light if it is given by the 
employer’s decision. Nevertheless, the influence cannot only be 
attributed to reciprocity. If it was just the principal’s underlying 
intention that triggered the loss in motivation, we should also 
observe a reduction in the higher paid agent’s effort. As the lower 
paid agent is randomly picked in each group, the principal’s decision 
is directed towards both agents and not to one special agent. Thus, 
even the favored agent might have a need to punish the principal’s 
unkindness by exerting less effort. But even though there is a decline 
in the higher paid agents’ effort of about 20% compared to 
T(Endogenous) and T(Exogenous), this difference is statistically not 
significant. Thus, pure reciprocity cannot explain the loss in agents’ 
motivation, too. Consequently, agents’ behavior seems to be driven 
by a combination of both, intention and distribution based concerns. 
If one can benefit from someone other’s unfriendly action, there 
hardly seems to be a reason to sanction this action. On the other side, 
if one is disadvantaged, but this disadvantage occurs randomly, 
inequity is not perceived as unfair and causes no reduction in 
motivation. 
Concluding, this study makes a contribution to the empirical 
distinction of the impact of inequity aversion and reciprocity. We 
show that the behavioral pattern with regard to fairness is neither 
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only triggered by the consequences of an action nor by the intention. 
People’s behavior is moreover determined by a combination of 
inequity aversion and reciprocity. 
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5.6 Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Experimental Instructions  
 
Welcome to this experiment! 
 
Please read the instructions carefully. In case you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. 
Please pay attention to the following: 
• All your decisions during the experiment will be made 
anonymously. 
• You will receive your payment at the end of the experiment. 
This also will be done anonymously. 
• Throughout the whole experiment all communication is 
strictly forbidden  
 
Course of the experiment: 
• The experiment consists of 6 rounds, each lasting for 5 
minutes. 
• Rounds 1 and 6 differ from rounds 2 to 5. 
 
The course of rounds 1 and 6 is as follows: 
You will be asked to count the number of occurrence of the cipher 7 
in blocks of random numbers. Please enter the result into the field on 
your screen and press the OK button.. 
ATTENTION: There is a maximum of 25 blocks of random numbers 
for you work with in each round. 
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Payment in round 1 and 6: 
You will receive 8 cents for every correct answer on your account. 
There will be no credit for incorrect answers, however you will not 
loose any credit from your account either. 
 
The course of rounds 2 to 5 is as follows: 
You will be randomly assigned to two other participants to form a 
team for the course of the experiment. Each team consists of two 
employees and one employer. At the beginning of the second round 
you will see your role as being either an employer or an employee on 
your screen. Your role assignment will be randomly assigned. The 
formation of your team stays the same for rounds 2 to 5, but you will 
not be informed of the identity of the other team members. 
 
Tasks in round 2 to 5: 
T(Equal) and T(Exogenous):  
• There are no tasks for employers, your screen remains white. 
After every period you will be notified about your employees’ 
performance and you will have to confirm this by pressing the 
OK button in order to start the next round. 
• As an employee you have to count the number of occurrences 
of the cipher 7 in blocks of random numbers (same task as in 
round 1 and 6). 
T(Endogenous): 
• As an employer you can choose to pay the same wage to both 
employees or to pay one employee more than the other one. 
Moreover, you will be notified about your employees’ 
performance and you will have to confirm this by pressing the 
OK button in order to start the next round. 
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• As an employee you have to count the number of occurrences 
of the cipher 7 in blocks of random numbers (same task as in 
round 1 and 6). 
ATTENTION: There is a maximum of 25 blocks of random numbers 
for you to work with in each round. 
 
Earnings in round 2 to 5: 
T(Equal): 
• As an employer you will receive 16 Euro at the beginning of 
the experiment, which will completely be used to pay your 
employees. You will pay your employees automatically 2 Euro 
at the beginning of each round. 
For every correct answer of your two employees (counting the 
amount of 7s) 8 cents will be transferred to your account. You 
will not receive any credit for incorrect answers by your 
employees, however there will not be any loss on your account 
either.  
• As the employee you will receive a performance-independent 
fixed wage of 8 Euro. You will receive a payment of 2 Euro 
on your account at the beginning of each round. 
T(Exogenous): 
• As an employer you will receive 14 Euro at the beginning of 
the experiment, which will completely be used to pay your 
employees. You will pay your employees automatically at the 
beginning of each round, one employee receives 2 Euro, the 
other one 1.50 Euro. 
For every correct answer of your two employees (counting the 
amount of 7s) 8 cents will be transferred to your account. You 
will not receive any credit for incorrect answers of your 
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employees, however there will not be any loss on your account 
either. 
• One employee of the team will receive a performance-
independent fixed wage of 8 Euro. He or she will receive a 
payment of 2 Euro at the beginning of each round. The team’s 
other employee will receive a performance-independent fixed 
wage of 6 Euro. He or she will receive a payment of 1.50 Euro 
at the beginning of each round. The employee of the team who 
gets the lower wage, is determined by the randomly assigned 
seating in the laboratory. This decision cannot be influenced 
by the employer. 
T(Endogenous): 
• As an employer you will receive 16 Euro at the beginning of 
the experiment to pay your employees. You can either pay 
both employees 2 Euro per round or you can pay one 
employee 2 Euro per round and the other employee 1.50 Euro. 
In case you choose the unequal payment, the remaining 2 Euro 
of the payment at the beginning of the experiment will be 
transferred to your account. 
For every correct answer of your two employees (counting the 
amount of 7s) 8 cents will be transferred to your account. You 
will not receive any credit for incorrect answers by your 
employees, however there will not be any loss on your account 
either.  
• Depending on the employer’s decision each employee may 
receive a wage of 2 Euro per round or one employee may 
receive 2 Euro per round while the other employee receives 
1.50 Euro per round. The employees receive their wage at the 
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beginning of each round. The employer’s decision will be 
displayed on your screen. 
In case the employer decides to pay unequal wages, the 
employee who gets the lower wage is determined by the 
randomly assigned seating in the laboratory. This decision 
cannot be influenced by the employer. It will be displayed on 
the employees’ screens which employee will receive the lower 
wage. 
 
At the beginning of rounds 2 to 5 every employee will be notified of 
how much money is transferred on his/her and the team’s other 
employee’s account. 
Although your employer gets a feedback about the performance of 
his/her team’s employees, you as an employee will not get any direct 
feedback about the (correct) amount of number blocks you solved 
during the previous round. 
 
After the 6th (and last) round you will be notified about your overall 
payout on your screens. In addition to your overall payout you will 
receive a show up fee of 2.50 Euro. 
 
After all you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire about the 
motives of your decisions. 
 
Please remain seated until your cabin number will be called up. 
Please bring your cabin number and this instructions sheet with you 
to the front desk , in order to process the payout of your results. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Chapter 6 
The Impact of Revealed Internal 
Pay Structures in Organizations 38 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Investigating the impact of the revealing of internal pay 
structures in organizations, this chapter deals with a similar question 
we studied in chapter 5. We conduct a gift-exchange game using an 
abstract effort decision. The principal has to offer a wage to the 
agent who responds by providing effort in terms of choosing a 
(costly) number out of a range of possible numbers that reduces his 
outcome. 
According to standard economic theory, a completely selfish 
agent would try to maximize his own payoff and therefore would 
                                                 
38 This chapter is based on Gerlach (2007d). 
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give no effort at all after having received his wage. This should be 
anticipated by the principal who in return should offer no positive 
wage. However, as we already discussed comprehensively in the 
preceding chapters of this thesis, human behavior is also driven by 
other-regarding preferences like reciprocity, fairness or inequity 
aversion (see e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995, Fehr et al. 
1996, Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr et al. 1998, Fehr/Falk 1999, 
Gächter/Fehr 2002).  
Theoretical explanations for these empirical findings that can be 
roughly classified into the distributional and the intentional approach 
all try to explain the impact of social preferences by extending the 
standard economic utility function by a term that characterizes the 
specific preferences. However, starting in the 1980s economists 
already took into account the influence of fairness on market 
mechanisms without remodeling the standard utility function. 
Kahneman et al. (1986) show that fair behavior might be 
counterproductive in maximizing a firm’s profit in the short run but 
leads to higher profits in the long run. Moreover, they show that 
fairness judgments are strongly influenced by the context of a given 
situation. This approach has recently been taken over by James 
Konow (2003) who proposes an integrated justice theory 
synthesizing previous approaches from different fields of research. 
One essential point of this theory deals with the impact of 
information while making one’s fairness judgment. An important 
question that arises is how far fairness judgments might be 
influenced by additional information.39 
There are several studies that investigate the impact of 
additional information between co-workers in an experimental labor 
                                                 
39 For example, Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005b) show that reciprocal behavior in a 
gift-exchange game is much stronger in a more transparent situation. 
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market. One example is given by Güth et al. (2001) who show that 
agents’ motivation is affected by horizontal influences. Agents who 
feel disfavored in comparison to their colleagues reduce their efforts. 
In contrast to this, Charness and Kuhn (2004) find the opposite 
result. Horizontal effectiveness is quite low. Agents’ motivation 
strongly depends on their own wage but hardly on their colleagues’ 
wages.  
The aim of this chapter is to continue the experimental 
investigation of the influence of transparent internal pay structures 
on employees’ motivation and to check for the controversial results 
of other studies. How far can employees be motivated or even 
demoralized by additional information in terms of revealed wages 
between employees? To answer this question, we conduct a simple 
gift-exchange game between one principal and three agents. The 
principal has to offer three (either equal or individual) wages to his 
agents and the agents in return may give an effort to the principal. In 
our first treatment, agents are not informed about their co-workers’ 
wages and efforts. In contrast, in our second treatment they are. 
Hence, we are able to investigate if and how far the additional 
information might influence agents’ effort decisions. 
 
The two mentioned studies of Güth et al. and Charness and 
Kuhn have in common that they extend the standard model of one 
principal and one agent by one additional agent, hence they analyze 
the impact of co-workers’ wages between two agents, where the 
group formation changes after each period. Furthermore, the two 
agents differ in their productivities so that it can be perceived as 
absolutely fair if the principal offers different wages to the agents. In 
both studies, agents are informed about their co-worker’s wage 
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respectively the offered contract by the principal, but they do not get 
to know the other agent’s effort decision. 
In contrast, in our study we investigate the relation between one 
principal and three agents in order to accentuate the horizontal 
influences between the workers. To increase the comparability 
between the three workers, they all have the same productivity. 
Hence, it is easily to determine if the offered wages are fair or not 
because in the beginning of the experiment the principal should be 
indifferent between the agents. Apart from that, the group formation 
stays the same during the whole experiment which lasts about 20 
periods. Since we are looking at the relationships between employers 
and employees, the repeated partner matching seems to be more 
realistic because labor market relations tend to be long-term 
relations. A further advantage of the partner matching is that we can 
use the information about wages and efforts of the preceding period, 
because workers are informed about their co-workers’ wages as well 
as their effort decisions in the end of each period.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In 
Section 6.2 we formulate our hypotheses. Section 6.3 presents the 
experimental design and procedure. We describe our empirical 
results in section 6.4 and conclude the paper with a critical 
discussion in section 6.5.  
 
 
 
6.2 Theoretical Predictions 
 
According to standard economic theory, people are supposed to 
be selfish and profit-maximizing. None of the players would give a 
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positive wage respectively a positive effort. However, as mentioned 
in the introduction, human behavior is not only driven by egoistical 
motives. There is ample evidence that other-regarding preferences 
play an important role in decision making, too. These preferences 
can be based either on intentional or distributional concerns. 
Intention based preferences mean that agents react with regard to the 
underlying intention of an action. If an action is perceived to be 
kind, reciprocal people are willing to reward this action by reacting 
kindly themselves. Thus, if the principal offers a positive wage, a 
reciprocal agent should answer by giving a positive effort, too. On 
the other hand, reciprocal people are also willing to punish an unkind 
action (Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger 2004). In line with this, we derive 
our first presumption: 
 
Presumption 6.1: 
In both treatments, we expect to observe agents who reciprocate. If 
the principal gives a positive wage, agents give a positive effort, too. 
The higher the wage, the higher the effort. 
 
Beside the fact that the principals give positive wages because 
they might anticipate that agents react reciprocally to generous 
wages, some principals might react reciprocally themselves. Since 
the group formation does not change during the whole experiment, 
we expect the principals’ wage decision to depend strongly on the 
agents’ effort decision of the previous period.  
 
Presumption 6.2: 
In both treatments, we also expect to observe reciprocal principals 
who reward generous effort decisions. The higher the given effort, 
the higher the wage offer of the following period should be. 
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In the next step, we analyze the impact of distribution based 
preferences. People who are inequity averse compare their own 
payoff with other people’s payoff and dislike unequally distributed 
payoffs (see e.g. Akerlof/Yellen 1990, Fehr/Kirchsteiger 1994, 
Fehr/Schmidt 1999, Bolton/Ockenfels 2000). However, it is not clear 
which payoff might be the agent’s reference point. Therefore, we 
distinguish between two kinds of influences, vertical and horizontal 
influences. Vertical inequity aversion concentrates on the 
distribution of the payoffs between two hierarchy levels, i.e. between 
the employer and the workers. On the other hand, horizontal inequity 
aversion refers to the payoff distribution within one hierarchy level, 
namely between the three workers. Thus, the vertical influences are 
given in both treatments. If an agent has earned a lower payoff than 
the principal in one period, he might try to eliminate this lack in the 
next period by reducing his effort.  
 
Presumption 6.3: 
In both treatments, we expect to observe a vertical inequity aversion. 
Agents whose payoff has been smaller than the principal’s payoff in 
the actual period might reduce their effort in the following period in 
order to equalize the ratio between the payoffs.  
 
In T(covered) where agents are not informed about their co-
workers’ wages and efforts, agents can only compare their own 
payoff with the principal’s payoff. Thus, there are only vertical 
influences. In addition to these vertical influences, in T(transparent) 
agents also get the information about their co-workers’ wages and 
efforts and therefore about their profits. Hence, agents also face 
horizontal influences. Apart from the principal’s payoff, now they 
can compare their own payoff with their co-workers’ payoff, too. We 
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expect the agents to aim at equally distributed payoffs within the 
same hierarchy level, because there are no differences in agents’ 
productivity. Thus, equal payoffs might be perceived to be fair. 
 
Presumption 6.4: 
In T(transparent), beside the vertical inequity aversion we also 
expect to observe horizontal influences. Agents who have earned a 
lower payoff than their co-workers in one period might reduce their 
effort in the following period to increase their own payoff. 
 
 
 
6.3 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics at the University Bonn. 80 participants 
(students of all fields of study) were recruited via the online 
recruiting-system of the University Bonn. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher 
1999).  
The 80 participants were spread equally over four sessions with 
two sessions for each treatment. So there were 40 students playing 
under covered information and 40 students playing under transparent 
information. Each session consisted of 20 identical periods and 
lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The participants were randomly 
and anonymously organized into groups of four where one team 
member was randomly assigned as principal and the other team 
members as agents. In order to avoid any contextual effects, the 
instructions were neutrally formulated. Principals and agents were 
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called player A and player B, the wage was called a transfer and the 
agents’ effort was just an input. The formation of the group as well 
as the assignment to roles did not change during the whole session. 
None of the participants got to know his team members and no 
communication were allowed at all unless via the experimental 
software. Each session consisted of five independent observations.   
In the beginning of each session, the students were read the 
instructions of the experiment in a separate room. After all questions 
had been answered, each participant threw a number between 1 and 
20 that indicated the place in the laboratory and with this the 
participant’s role during the experiment. Each student (principal and 
agent) started with an endowment of 70 in the experimental currency 
“Taler”. One Taler was converted into Euro in the end of the 
experiment with an exchange rate of 0.08 €/Taler. In the beginning 
of each period, the principal had to choose a wage out of the range 
[0, 1, …, 16 Taler] for each of his three agents, so the maximum 
amount he could offer in a whole was 48 Taler. Whether the three 
wages were similar or differed from each other depended on the 
principal’s decision. The wages were subtracted from the principal’s 
total and credited to the agents. Afterwards, the agents had to make 
an abstract effort decision choosing a number out of the range [0, 1, 
…, 20]. The higher the number the more Taler were subtracted from 
the agents total and given to the principal, representing each agent’s 
individual costs of effort. A table and chart with the costs of effort 
was handed out with the instructions to all participants.40 After the 
agents had made their effort decision the profits were realized as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
40 See appendix 6. 
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• profit (principal) = (effort of all of the three agents) – wages 
• profit (agent) = wage – individual costs of effort 
 
While in the first treatment one period now was finished and the 
next one started immediately, in the second treatment wages and 
efforts of all agents were made transparent within their group before 
the next period started, too. Henceforth, we call the first treatment 
T(covered) and the second treatment T(transparent).  
After the 20th period, the students had to answer some 
questions concerning their motivation to act and the experiment 
finished with the payout of the earnings. 
 
 
 
6.4 Experimental Results 
 
In the first step, we look at some descriptive details of our 
experimental data. Table 6.1 presents the average efforts and wages: 
 
Table 6.1: Average efforts and wages 
 T(covered) T(transparent) 
 
Average effort per period and agent 
 
6.54 
 
 
6.40 
 
Average wage per period and agent (in Taler) 
 
5.33 
 
5.42 
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The average effort is slightly higher and the average wage 
slightly lower in T(covered) than in T(transparent). However, both 
differences are statistically not significant (Mann-Whitney U-Test).  
To control for reciprocity in players’ preferences, we check the 
influence of the given wage on agents’ effort decision as well as the 
influence of the effort on the principals’ wage offer in the next 
period. Therefore, we run two simple linear regressions that are 
shown in tables 6.2 and 6.3: 
 
Table 6.2: Dependent variable: agents’ effort decision 
 T(covered) T(transparent) 
actual wage 0.958      (0.037)*** 
0.904 
      (0.047)*** 
period-dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.72 0.71 
observations 600 600 
[Note: Robust standard errors clustered for groups (10 clusters per treatment) are 
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level denoted *** 
(**, *).] 
 
 
In both treatments, the principals’ wage offer has a positive and 
highly significant influence on agents’ effort decision. Thus, we can 
confirm presumption 6.1, that agents react reciprocally. 
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Table 6.3: Dependent variable: principals’ wage offer 
 T(covered) T(transparent) 
effort of previous 
period 
0.754 
     (0.039)*** 
0.703 
      (0.042)*** 
period-dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.79 0.63 
observations 570 570 
[Note: Robust standard errors clustered for groups (10 clusters per treatment) are 
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level denoted *** 
(**, *).] 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows the influence of agents’ effort on the 
principals’ decision making in the following period. In both 
treatments we find a positive and again highly significant influence 
on the principals’ wage offer.  
 
Result 6.1: 
In both treatments, there is a substantial amount of players who 
behave reciprocally. 
 
Next, we come to the impact of inequity aversion on agents’ 
behavior. Firstly, we analyze the vertical influences. We generate a 
variable vertical, subtracting the agent’s profit from the principal’s 
profit41 of the preceding period.42 Hence, if the principal has earned 
more than the agent in the preceding period, vertical becomes a 
positive value, if he has earned less it becomes a negative value.  
 
                                                 
41 Vertical = principal’s profit – agent’s profit 
 
42 To measure vertical inequity aversion we just consider the principal’s profit 
from the interaction of the corresponding agent, disregarding the principal’s 
profit from the two other agents of his group. 
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Table 6.4: Dependent variable: agents’ effort decision 
 T(covered) T(transparent) 
actual wage 0.966      (0.040)*** 
0.935 
      (0.049)*** 
vertical 0.006 (0.033) 
0.058 
 (0.040) 
period-dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.73 0.74 
observations 570 570 
[Note: Robust standard errors clustered for groups (10 clusters per treatment) are 
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level denoted *** 
(**, *).] 
 
 
The estimation in table 6.4 shows that with and without wage 
transparency there is hardly any impact of vertical inequity aversion 
on the agents’ motivation to exert effort.43 The influence of the 
difference between the principal’s and the agent’s profit is neither 
economically interesting nor statistically significant. This result 
contradicts our prediction in presumption 6.3 where we expected to 
observe a kind of vertical inequity aversion in both treatments. A 
possible explanation might be found in the experimental design. In 
the first stage of a gift-exchange game, the principal chooses the 
wage level he wants to offer to the agent. In the second stage, the 
agent responds to the offered wage by choosing a corresponding 
effort level. Hence, the agent himself is responsible for the profit of 
both, principal and agent. If the agent finishes the period with a 
lower profit than the principal’s one, this is just due to his own effort 
decision. Thus, it is not that surprising that the agents do not respond 
to unequally distributed payoffs. 
 
                                                 
43 This effect has also been shown by Maximiano et al. (2004) who show that 
while comparing between two hierarchy levels, agents’ behavior is mainly 
influenced by reciprocity instead of inequity aversion or fairness concerns. 
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Result 6.2: 
We do not observe any impact of vertical inequity aversion on 
agents’ behavior. 
 
Next we investigate the horizontal influences between the three 
workers. As in T(covered) the agents are not informed about their co-
workers’ wages and efforts, there should be no horizontal influences. 
In T(transparent), however, we expect to observe some influences 
due to the given additional information. As done above to measure 
the vertical inequity aversion, we now generate a variable horizontal 
that measures the differences between the three agents’ payoffs. This 
time, we subtract one agent’s profit from the other two agents’ 
average effort per group and per period.44 Again, we use the data 
from one period to measure the horizontal inequity aversion in the 
next period. Table 6.5 shows the estimation of a linear regression: 
 
Table 6.5: Dependent variable: agents’ effort decision 
 T(covered) T(transparent) 
actual wage 0.966      (0.038)*** 
0.931 
      (0.048)*** 
vertical 0.077 (0.055) 
0.094 
 (0.051) 
horizontal - 0.172 (0.133) 
- 0.105 
   (0.056)* 
period-dummies yes yes 
R-squared 0.74 0.74 
observations 570 570 
[Note: Robust standard errors clustered for groups (10 clusters per treatment) are 
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level denoted *** 
(**, *).] 
 
 
                                                 
44 Horizontal = (sum of co-workers’ profit)/2 – agent’s profit 
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As expected, the variable horizontal has no significant influence 
in T(covered) where agents do not get the information about their co-
workers. However, we find a negative and slightly significant effect 
in T(transparent). Agents who earned less than their co-workers 
reduce their effort in the following period.  
 
Result 6.3: 
We observe weak horizontal inequity aversion in T(transparent). 
Agents compare their own profit with their co-workers’ profit and 
slightly reduce their effort if they have earned less before. 
 
 
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
In this study we investigate the impact of transparent wage 
distributions in organizations on workers’ motivation in an 
experimental labor market.  We extend the standard one principal-
one agent relationship to an one employer-three workers setting in a 
gift-exchange game. While in one treatment the workers do not get 
any information about their co-workers, in a second treatment they 
are informed about their wages and efforts after each period. 
Beside reciprocal behavior with regard to the intention that 
underlies a given wage offer, we also expected to observe agents’ 
behavior to be affected by distributional concerns. These 
distributional concerns can be divided in vertical and horizontal 
influences, where the vertical inequity aversion refers to the payoff 
distribution between two hierarchy levels and the horizontal inequity 
aversion within one hierarchy level.  
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Our results show that reciprocity indeed is a major driver of 
agents’ effort decision. However, we find only little evidence for the 
impact of inequity aversion. While there is no effect of vertical 
influences in both treatments, we find a weakly significant impact of 
horizontal influences in T(transparent) where agents are confronted 
with the additional information about their co-workers’ wages and 
efforts. As this influence is missing in T(covered), we conclude that 
agents consider the horizontal payoff distribution in their calculus 
when wages are discovered.   
 
A possible reason for the weak results concerning the vertical 
influences might be due to some details of our experimental design. 
As already mentioned, it is in the agents’ own responsibility if their 
profit in one period exceeds the principal’s profit or not. Thus, even 
if an agent has earned less than the principal in one period, there 
might be no incentive to react to this inequity. This might explain 
why the coefficient of the vertical inequity aversion is economically 
very small and statistically not significant. In line with Charness and 
Kuhn, one can also argue that the agents have to respond to several 
influences while choosing their effort, namely to the perceived 
adequacy of their received wage offer and to the profits of the other 
players. Hence, it might be that distributional influences are 
suppressed by reciprocal influences. This might even be strengthened 
by the fact that the distributional concerns refer to the preceding 
period while the intentional concerns refer to the actual period. The 
agent is not able to change the principal’s and his own past profits, 
but he can control their actual profits. 
Beside these arguments, one must also take into account that 
social behavior of course might be strongly affected by interpersonal 
contact which is eliminated in such a laboratory experiment. But 
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even in the anonymous and context-free situation as given in our 
experiment we do find the existence of social preferences in the 
players’ behavioral pattern. Hence, due to the practical relevance of 
this research question it might be worthwhile to conduct further 
experiments implementing more realistic conditions, such as 
communication or a real effort task. 
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6.6 Appendix to Chapter 6 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
Periods and roles 
• The experiment lasts about 20 periods. 
• During the experiment, you are part of a group that consists of 
four members. You will not know the identity of the other group 
members. The group constellation stays the same during the 
whole experiment. 
• In each group, there are two kinds of players: One player A and 
three players B. The participants are randomly assigned to roles 
in the beginning and will not change their role during the 
experiment. 
 
Course of the period 
• Player A’s transfer decision 
In the beginning of each period, player A offers three transfers to 
the players B, i.e. player A specifies three amounts in the 
experimental currency Taler from the range {0, 1, …, 16}. These 
transfers may but need not to be identical. The transfers are 
immediately subtracted from the player A’s account and credited 
to the players B. 
• Player B’s decision 
When the transfers have been credited to the players B, each 
player B chooses a number from the range {0, 1, …, 20} he wants 
to give to player A. The higher the chosen the number, the higher 
are player B’s individual costs (see table of costs). The according 
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costs are subtracted from player B’s account and the chosen 
number is credited as Taler to player B. 
• Information (only T(covered)) 
Please note that the players B will not be informed about the 
other players’ B transfers and numbers of their group! The period 
is now finished and the next one starts. 
• Information (only T(transparent)) 
After all players B have chosen their numbers, all players will get 
informed about the other players’ B transfers and numbers of 
their group. The period is now finished and the next one starts. 
 
Endowment and payoff 
In the beginning of the experiment, each participant gets an 
endowment in the experimental currency Taler. This endowment of 
70 Taler is the same for all players (A and B). In the end of the 
experiment, the total account will be paid with an exchange rate of 
0.08€/Taler to the participants. 
 
Please note: 
• No communication will be allowed – except via the experimental 
software. 
• All decision will stay anonymously, i.e. no one gets to know the 
other participants’ identity. 
• The payoff, too, will be anonymous, i.e. no participant gets to 
know the other players’ payoffs. 
• These instructions will be collected in the end of the experiment. 
 
Good luck! 
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
costs
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
number
 
 
 
 
number   costs 
1   0,04 
2   0,15 
3   0,35 
4   0,62 
5   0,96 
6   1,39 
7   1,86 
8   2,46 
9   3,12 
10   3,85 
11   4,65 
12   5,54 
13   6,50 
14   7,54 
15   8,65 
16   9,85 
17   11,12 
18   12,46 
19   13,86 
20   15,39 
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